People v. Mill
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: Executive Orders Nos. 400 and 58 created the City of Greater Manila, absorbing Quezon City. On August 8, 1946, an information for murder was filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila against petitioner Eulogio Mill, alleging the crime occurred in Quezon City on June 8, 1946. The information detailed the stabbing of Iluminada Cabio, resulting in her death. 2. Procedural History: Petitioner Mill evaded arrest for eight years until his arraignment on December 14, 1955. Prior to this, on October 10, 1946, Republic Act No. 54 was enacted, repealing the executive orders and restoring Quezon City's status. On January 3, 1956, Mill's counsel moved to quash the information in the Manila court, arguing lack of jurisdiction due to the revival of Quezon City. The motion was granted, and the case was dismissed. Subsequently, on January 21, 1956, an information for the same murder was filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City Branch). Mill pleaded not guilty, but later sought to withdraw his plea to file another motion to quash, alleging double jeopardy. This motion was denied on February 25, 1956, and a motion for reconsideration was also denied on March 10, 1956. 3. The Petition: Alleging no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law, petitioner Eulogio Mill filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction in the Supreme Court on March 15, 1956. He sought to annul the orders denying his motion to quash and motion for reconsideration, and to prohibit the respondent court from further proceeding in Criminal Case No. Q-1907. The Supreme Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction upon posting of a bond. The Court considered whether certiorari and prohibition were proper remedies, noting that an order denying a motion to quash is interlocutory and generally not appealable, but that appeal from the final judgment is the proper recourse.
Issue(s)
Whether certiorari and prohibition lie against an order denying a motion to quash. Whether the petitioner may, as a matter of right, withdraw his plea of "not guilty" to file a motion to quash.
Ruling
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and set aside the writ of preliminary injunction. It held that certiorari and prohibition do not lie against an order denying a motion to quash an information, as such an order is merely interlocutory and appeal in due time is the proper remedy. The Court also held that the withdrawal of a plea of "not guilty" to file a motion to quash is a matter of judicial discretion and not a right.
Ratio Decidendi
On the availability of certiorari and prohibition: The Court reiterated the principle that certiorari and prohibition are extraordinary remedies available only when there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. An order denying a motion to quash an information is interlocutory because it does not finally dispose of the case; it merely allows the trial to proceed. Therefore, the proper remedy for the aggrieved party is to proceed with the trial and, if a final judgment is rendered against them, to appeal that judgment. The Court cited Arches vs. Beldia, et al., holding that neither certiorari nor prohibition lie against an order of the court granting or denying a motion to quash an information if the courts have jurisdiction to take cognizance of the cases and to decide the motion to quash, as appeal in due time is the obvious and only remedy. On the right to withdraw a plea to file a motion to quash: The Court clarified that under Rule 113, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, a defendant shall immediately either move to quash or plead upon arraignment. While a defendant has a right to move to quash before pleading, once a plea of "not guilty" has been entered, the withdrawal of such plea to file a motion to quash becomes a matter of judicial discretion. The Court cited U.S. vs. Schneer and U.S. vs. Baluyot, which held that a defendant has no right after pleading not guilty to withdraw that plea and present a demurrer (now motion to quash), and it is within the discretion of the court to grant or deny permission to do so. In this case, there was no showing that the respondent Judge abused his discretion in denying the petitioner's motion.
Main Doctrine
Certiorari and prohibition do not lie against an order denying a motion to quash an information if the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case and decide the motion, as appeal in due time is the proper remedy.