Acuña v. Caluag
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: This case originates from a real estate mortgage executed by Emiliano Acuña and Nieves B. Acuña in favor of Reynaldo T. Santos on April 21, 1950, to secure a loan of P25,000 with interest. The mortgage included two parcels of land and improvements. The mortgagors also agreed to keep the properties insured and to pay 20% of the total obligation as liquidated damages, plus P500 for attorney's fees, in case of judicial or extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings. The mortgagors failed to make payments within the stipulated period. 2. Procedural History: On May 2, 1951, Santos filed a foreclosure complaint. A judgment was rendered on August 1, 1951, based on a written agreement reducing the liquidated damages to P500. The judgment became final, and a writ of execution led to the sale of the mortgaged properties to Santos on February 23, 1952. The sale was confirmed, and a writ of possession was issued on May 15, 1952. Petitioners' motion for extension to vacate was denied. An alias writ of possession was issued on June 2, 1953. On June 9, 1953, the parties submitted a new agreement for the purchase of the properties by the defendants for P40,000, payable by December 31, 1953, with monthly payments for use and occupation, and forfeiture of previous payments. This agreement was to supersede previous ones. However, the defendants failed to comply with this agreement, leading to another alias writ of possession on September 23, 1953. Petitioners moved to quash this writ, which was initially held in abeyance due to the 60-day lapse period. Subsequently, on July 8, 1954, an order for an alias writ of possession was issued, from which petitioners appealed. On October 28, 1955, a receiver was appointed over the properties, and an order was issued on February 7, 1956, directing the sheriff to place the receiver in possession. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied on April 25, 1956. 3. The Petition: The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and preliminary injunction, seeking to set aside the orders issued by the respondent Judge, alleging grave abuse of discretion and lack of jurisdiction. Their primary contention is that the perfection of their appeal in the main case divested the trial court of jurisdiction over the question of possession. They argue that the trial court could not deprive them of actual possession and deliver it to another. The petitioners also questioned the validity of the alias writ of possession issued on September 23, 1953, arguing it was null and void due to satisfaction or novation of the judgment by the June 9, 1953 agreement and the lapse of its enforceability period.
Issue(s)
Whether the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion or acted without jurisdiction in appointing a receiver and issuing orders for the delivery of possession of the property to the receiver, despite the perfection of an appeal in the main case. Whether the perfection of an appeal divests the trial court of jurisdiction over matters concerning the preservation of the property under litigation.
Ruling
The petition for certiorari is denied. The orders of the respondent judge appointing a receiver and directing the petitioners to deliver possession of the property to the receiver are valid.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of jurisdiction after perfection of appeal: The Court held that while the perfection of an appeal generally deprives the trial court of jurisdiction over the case, it retains jurisdiction concerning the preservation of the property under litigation. This includes the authority to appoint a receiver to take and keep possession of the property in controversy, as provided for under Rule 61, Sections 1(d) and 7 of the Rules of Court. The Court cited Velasco & Co. vs. Go Chuico and Jocson vs. Presbitero et al. in support of this principle. The appointment of a receiver is a measure to safeguard the property pending the appeal, ensuring its preservation and the collection of rents. On the propriety of the receiver's appointment and possession order: The Court noted that petitioners did not contest the legality or propriety of the receiver's appointment in the trial court, nor did they file a motion for reconsideration of the order appointing the receiver. This made it "rather late" to raise the question of its propriety. Furthermore, the Court considered the respondents' assertions that petitioners were insolvent, the building was in danger of destruction or impairment, and petitioners had failed to pay rents for an extended period, justifying the appointment of a receiver. The Court clarified that the order to deliver possession to the receiver did not decide the ultimate question of who had a better right to possession, which was the subject of the appeal. Instead, it was a provisional measure pending the appeal to preserve the property and its fruits. Therefore, the orders directing petitioners to deliver possession to the receiver were deemed valid and their duty was to obey them.
Main Doctrine
The perfection of an appeal does not divest the trial court of its jurisdiction to preserve the property under litigation, including the authority to appoint a receiver.