Rodriguez v. Fernandez

G.R. No. L-10823 · 1957-05-28 · J. BENGZON, J.: · Primary: Remedial; Secondary: Civil
REITERATION

Facts

1. The Antecedents: The underlying dispute concerns the rightful applicant and possessor of two fishpond lots, Lot No. 3907 (38 hectares) and Lot No. 3162 (20 hectares), located in Padada, Davao. Felipe Deluao and Supremo Deluao were the competing applicants. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources had initially approved Felipe's application for Lot No. 3907 and Supremo's for Lot No. 3162. Felipe Deluao, however, claimed both lots, initiating an administrative contest that led to judicial review. 2. Procedural History: Felipe Deluao filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Davao seeking to modify the award made by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. After a trial where the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Director of Fisheries were represented, the respondent judge rendered a decision in favor of Felipe Deluao, declaring him the rightful applicant and possessor of both lots. The petitioners, the Secretary and the Director, attempted to appeal this decision. The appeal was filed on April 12, 1956, but was objected to by Felipe Deluao as being filed out of time. The lower court agreed and denied the appeal. 3. The Petition: This is a petition for mandamus filed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Acting Director of Fisheries, seeking to compel the respondent judge to give due course to their appeal. The petitioners contend that their appeal was timely because notice of the decision was served on the Provincial Fiscal on April 11, 1956, and the appeal was filed the following day. They argue that the Provincial Fiscal, not Atty. Marfori (who had allegedly withdrawn or whose appearance was provisional), was their counsel of record. The Supreme Court, however, found that notice to Atty. Marfori on March 27, 1956, constituted notice to the petitioners, as no formal substitution of counsel had occurred, and the appeal filed on April 12, 1956, was therefore one day late, barring the appeal.

Issue(s)

Whether the appeal was filed within the reglementary period. Whether notice of the decision to Atty. Marfori constituted notice to the petitioners, thereby starting the period for appeal.

Ruling

The petition for mandamus is denied. The appeal was filed out of time.

Ratio Decidendi

On Whether the appeal was filed within the reglementary period: The Court held that the appeal was filed out of time. The notice of appeal was filed on April 12, 1956, which was the sixteenth day after Atty. Marfori received notice of the decision on March 27, 1956. The reglementary period for appeal is fifteen days. Tardiness, even by one day, has been consistently held sufficient to bar an appeal. On Whether notice of the decision to Atty. Marfori constituted notice to the petitioners, thereby starting the period for appeal: The Court ruled that notice to Atty. Marfori was valid notice to the petitioners. Under the Rules of Court, where a party has two attorneys, notice to one of them is notice to the party. There was no formal substitution of attorneys, and the Assistant Fiscal never claimed in the lower court that such substitution had occurred. The Fiscal's Office appeared as counsel, and the notice served on Atty. Marfori on March 27, 1956, was therefore effective in commencing the period for appeal. The Court found no circumstances justifying a relaxation of this rule, noting that if any attorney appeared provisionally or in collaboration, it was likely the Assistant Fiscal, as the Solicitor General's Office is the primary counsel for national officials.

Main Doctrine

Notice to one of two attorneys of record for a party constitutes notice to the party itself, and the period for appeal commences from the date of such notice. Tardiness, even by one day, is sufficient to bar an appeal.

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