Unson v. Lacson
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: The underlying dispute concerns the validity of Manila Municipal Ordinance No. 3470 and a subsequent lease contract between the City of Manila and Genato Commercial Corporation (Genato). Petitioner Cipriano E. Unson, owner of a lot adjacent to a portion of Callejon de Carmen, alleges that the ordinance and lease illegally withdrew this public alley from public use and leased it to Genato, thereby obstructing access to his property. Unson's property, leased to the National Government for the Mapa High School, has an enrollment of over 1,500 students. Procedural History: The petitioner, Cipriano E. Unson, initiated this action in the Court of First Instance of Manila seeking to annul Municipal Ordinance No. 3470 and cancel the lease agreement with Genato Commercial Corporation. The lower court dismissed the petition, ruling that the City of Manila, as owner of Callejon del Carmen, possessed the authority to withdraw it from public use and declare it patrimonial property. The court also found the ordinance valid, citing its approval by the National Planning Commission. Unson appealed this decision to the Supreme Court, arguing the illegality of the ordinance and the lease contract. The Petition: The petitioner, Cipriano E. Unson, appeals to the Supreme Court, asserting that Manila Municipal Ordinance No. 3470 and the subsequent lease agreement with Genato Commercial Corporation are illegal. He contends that the City of Manila lacks the explicit authority under its charter (Republic Act No. 409) to close or withdraw public streets and alleys from public use, unlike other municipalities which are granted such power under the Revised Administrative Code. Furthermore, Unson argues that the ordinance and lease violate Article 638 of the Civil Code by obstructing the public easement along the banks of the Estero de San Sebastian. The petition also challenges the validity of the National Planning Commission's approval, citing prior Supreme Court rulings on undue delegation of legislative powers and the inoperability of emergency powers.
Issue(s)
Whether the City of Manila has the authority under Republic Act No. 409 to close a public alley and withdraw it from public use. Whether the approval of the ordinance by the National Urban Planning Commission (NUPC) cured the City's lack of authority. Whether the construction of a building on the withdrawn portion of the alley violates the legal easement of public use under Article 638 of the Civil Code.
Ruling
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of First Instance, declaring Municipal Ordinance No. 3470 and the contract of lease null and void. The Court held that the City of Manila, as a creature of Congress, possesses only expressly granted powers and lacks the authority to close or convert public alleys into patrimonial property without specific legislative grant. The ordinance was also found to be inconsistent with Article 638 of the Civil Code concerning easements of public use along river banks.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Court ruled that the City of Manila lacks the power to close public alleys because such authority was not expressly granted in Republic Act No. 409 (RA 409). While Section 18(x) of RA 409 authorizes the construction and improvement of thoroughfares, it is silent regarding their closure. The Court contrasted this with Section 2246 of the Revised Administrative Code, which explicitly grants regular municipalities the power to close roads, concluding that the omission in the Manila Charter indicates a legislative intent to withhold that power. Municipal corporations are creatures of Congress and can only exercise powers that are clearly delegated. Therefore, any ordinance attempting to withdraw a street from public use without such express authority is ultra vires. On Issue 2: The Court found that the approval of Ordinance No. 3470 by the National Urban Planning Commission (NUPC) did not validate the City's act. Applying the precedent in University of the East v. The City of Manila, the Court held that the delegation of power to the NUPC via Executive Orders 98 and 367 was undue due to a lack of sufficient standards. Furthermore, these executive orders were issued under the President's emergency powers, which became inoperative once Congress reconvened post-liberation. Since RA 409 was enacted after these executive orders, the provisions of the later legislative act must prevail over the acts of the executive agent. The NUPC's role was intended to limit and coordinate local powers, not to grant new ones that the legislature had specifically withheld. On Issue 3: The ordinance and lease were found to be inconsistent with Article 638 of the Civil Code, which imposes a three-meter easement of public use along the banks of rivers and streams. The building constructed by Genato rendered it impossible for the public to use the zone along the margin of the Estero de San Sebastian for navigation, fishing, or salvage. The Court distinguished previous cases like Ayala de Roxas v. City of Manila, noting that Callejon del Carmen is public property belonging to the State, not private land. The City of Manila, as a political subdivision, cannot dispose of its property in a manner that defeats the public policy and easements established by the Civil Code for the general interest of the public.
Main Doctrine
A municipal corporation, as a creature of Congress, possesses only such powers as are expressly granted to it. The power to close or withdraw a public street or alley from public use and convert it into patrimonial property cannot be exercised by the City of Manila without express legislative grant, and such power is not merely incidental to the ownership or the power to construct streets. Furthermore, such an ordinance cannot be sustained if it contravenes existing laws, such as the provisions on easements of public use along river banks.