People v. Montiel
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: The accused, Eduardo Montiel, was arrested and tried by the justice of the peace of Romblon for the crime of theft (hurto). While the justice of the peace was dictating the sentence, the accused attacked and wounded him with a penknife. Procedural History: An information was filed charging the accused with frustrated murder and attempt against an authority. The accused demurred, which was sustained, and the fiscal was ordered to amend the information. The fiscal amended the information, omitting the charge for attempt against an authority and later presented a new complaint for that offense. The accused insisted that a warrant of arrest was issued and he was imprisoned upon the original information, thus claiming double jeopardy. The Petition: The accused appealed the decision of the Court of First Instance, which overruled his plea of twice in jeopardy.
Issue(s)
Whether the accused was placed in legal jeopardy when a warrant of arrest was issued and he was imprisoned upon the original information. Whether the plea of twice in jeopardy can be maintained under the given circumstances.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment and sentence of the trial court, holding that the plea of twice in jeopardy could not be maintained. The costs of the instance were assessed against the appellant.
Ratio Decidendi
On Whether the accused was placed in legal jeopardy when a warrant of arrest was issued and he was imprisoned upon the original information: The Court held that an accused cannot be considered in jeopardy in the meaning of the act of Congress of July 1, 1902, until the trial has actually begun. In this case, the accused's demurrer was interposed before his trial on the complaint had commenced. Furthermore, he was never arraigned on that complaint, nor were witnesses called for either the prosecution or the defense. Therefore, the legal proceedings had not reached a stage where jeopardy could attach. The mere issuance of a warrant of arrest and subsequent imprisonment does not, in itself, constitute being placed in legal jeopardy if the trial has not commenced. On Whether the plea of twice in jeopardy can be maintained under the given circumstances: The Court reiterated the principle that jeopardy requires the commencement of a trial. Since the trial had not begun when the demurrer was filed and sustained, and no further proceedings were had on the original information, the accused had not been placed in legal jeopardy. Consequently, the plea of twice in jeopardy could not be maintained. The subsequent filing of a new information for a related offense, after the first proceedings were halted before trial, did not violate the prohibition against double jeopardy. The court's decision in United States v. Ballentine was cited as precedent, establishing that jeopardy attaches only when the trial has actually commenced.
Main Doctrine
An accused cannot be considered in jeopardy until the trial has actually begun, meaning before the defendant's demurrer, the trial on that complaint has begun, and the accused was never arraigned thereon nor were witnesses called either for the prosecution or the defense.