Torre v. Querubin

G.R. No. L-9519 · 1957-04-15 · J. MONTEMAYOR, J.: · Primary: Civil; Secondary: Remedial
REITERATION

Facts

The Antecedents: The underlying dispute concerns the possession of a parcel of land, Lot No. 1574, in Kalibo, Capiz. Saturnina Uy Bien Piao claimed ownership and possession of this land, asserting that she and her predecessors had occupied it since 1888 and that it was adjudicated to her in a prior civil case. She alleged that the petitioners, the Torre family, unlawfully entered the property after she was placed in possession by the sheriff, depriving her of its use and enjoyment. Procedural History: Saturnina Uy Bien Piao filed a complaint seeking possession of Lot No. 1574 and requested a preliminary mandatory injunction to restore her to possession and prevent further disturbance by the Torre family. Initially, the respondent Judge, Jose R. Querubin, denied the petition for a preliminary injunction. However, upon a motion for reconsideration and despite opposition from the Torre family, the respondent Judge reversed his earlier decision and granted the preliminary injunction, finding that Saturnina had indeed been placed in possession by the sheriff and that the Torre family had subsequently occupied the land by force. The Petition: The petitioners, Eutiquio, Tranquilino, and Benito Torre, filed this petition for a writ of certiorari seeking to nullify the respondent Judge's order dated March 21, 1955, which granted the preliminary injunction. They question whether the trial court was authorized to issue such a writ during the pendency of the civil case. The petition argues that prior to the New Civil Code, a preliminary injunction should not have been used to dispossess a party already in actual possession. However, the Supreme Court considered Article 539 of the New Civil Code, which permits the issuance of a preliminary mandatory injunction to restore possession in cases of forcible entry, and found the respondent Judge's order to be in accordance with this provision.

Issue(s)

Whether the respondent Judge was authorized to issue a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction during the pendency of the civil case to restore possession to the plaintiff who had been previously placed in possession by the sheriff but was subsequently dispossessed by the defendants. Whether the issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, under the circumstances, constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

Ruling

The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied. The order of the respondent Judge issuing the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction is upheld.

Ratio Decidendi

On the issue of the authority to issue a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction: The Court held that prior to the New Civil Code of 1950, it was generally improper to issue a preliminary injunction that would dispossess a party already in material possession. However, the law has since changed with the promulgation of the New Civil Code. Article 539 of the New Civil Code now explicitly authorizes the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction during the pendency of an action to recover possession. This change was motivated by the Code Commission's observation that prolonged litigations often resulted in owners being deprived of possession even when they had an immediate right thereto. In this case, the trial court found that Saturnina had been placed in possession by the sheriff in execution of a final judgment. The defendants, the Torrebros., were aware of this action but subsequently entered the land by force and intimidation, depriving Saturnina of her possession. Therefore, the issuance of the writ by the respondent Judge was in accordance with Article 539 of the New Civil Code, as Saturnina was a possessor who was disturbed in her possession after being placed in possession by the sheriff. On the issue of grave abuse of discretion: The Court found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent Judge. The Judge's order was based on his findings that Saturnina had been placed in possession by the sheriff, as evidenced by the Sheriff's Return of Service and Minutes of the Delivery of Possession, and that the defendants' occupation began only after Saturnina had been placed in possession. These findings were supported by the evidence presented before the trial court. Furthermore, Saturnina had requested the injunction and offered to file a bond, as contemplated by the rules. The issuance of the writ was a proper exercise of the court's authority under Article 539 of the New Civil Code to protect a possessor who has been forcibly dispossessed.

Main Doctrine

The Supreme Court affirmed the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction under Article 539 of the New Civil Code, holding that such a writ is available to a possessor who was previously placed in possession by a sheriff and was subsequently deprived of that possession through force and intimidation. This provision allows for the restoration of possession during the pendency of an action to recover the property, addressing situations where prolonged litigations might otherwise leave owners deprived of their rightful possession.

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