Monge v. Angeles
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Plaintiffs-appellants executed a deed of sale of a parcel of land, acquired under a homestead patent, in favor of defendants-appellees, with a right to repurchase within one year from the date of sale. Due to the plaintiffs' failure to repurchase within the stipulated period, the sale became absolute on July 30, 1949. Ownership was consolidated on January 17, 1953, pursuant to an order of consolidation. Plaintiffs claimed they could still exercise the right to repurchase within five years from July 30, 1949, under Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, and tendered the repurchase price, which was refused. They then consigned the money with the clerk of court and filed an action. Procedural History: Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that it did not state a cause of action and that the action was not commenced within the prescribed period. The trial court sustained the motion and dismissed the case. The Petition: Plaintiffs-appellants appealed the dismissal of their complaint, questioning the period within which the right to repurchase could be exercised.
Issue(s)
Whether the five-year period for a homesteader to repurchase a homestead sold by him, under Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, should be counted from the date of the sale or from the date of the consolidation of ownership in favor of the purchaser. Whether the plaintiffs-appellants can still exercise the right to repurchase the land.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the order of dismissal, holding that the period for repurchase under Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 commences from the date of the conveyance.
Ratio Decidendi
On the period for repurchase: The Court held that Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 is clear and admits no interpretation. It provides that "Every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or homestead provisions, when proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or legal heirs, within the period of five years from the date of the conveyance, regardless of its nature." The term "conveyance" is of American origin and refers to any instrument by which an estate or interest in real estate is created, alienated, mortgaged, or assigned. Therefore, the five-year period must be counted from the date of the actual sale or conveyance, not from the date of the consolidation of ownership. The pretense of the appellants that the period should be counted from the date of consolidation is untenable. On the right to repurchase: Based on the interpretation of Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, the plaintiffs-appellants' right to repurchase expired one year from the date of the sale on July 30, 1949, as they failed to exercise it within that stipulated period. The subsequent consolidation of ownership did not extend this period. The Court cited previous decisions, Blanco vs. Bailon and Galanza vs. Nuesa, which affirmed that the period to repurchase is counted from the date of the deed of sale, and that parties are not prohibited from agreeing on a specific period for repurchase starting from the date of the deed of sale. Thus, the action was not commenced within the period prescribed by law.
Main Doctrine
The five-year period for a homesteader to repurchase a homestead sold by him, as provided in Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, commences from the date of the conveyance, regardless of whether the sale includes a right to repurchase or whether ownership has subsequently been consolidated in favor of the purchaser.