Soriano v. Asi
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: The underlying dispute concerns the probate of the alleged will of Crisanta Soriano. Antonio Asi filed a petition to have the will admitted to probate and was appointed administrator. However, Asi intentionally omitted the name of Emilio Soriano, the nephew of the deceased and an intestate heir, from the petition. This omission prevented Soriano from receiving notice of the probate proceedings and the hearing date, thereby depriving him of the opportunity to contest the will. 2. Procedural History: Antonio Asi filed a petition to probate the will of Crisanta Soriano, which was granted by the probate court. Emilio Soriano, an heir who was not notified of the proceedings, filed a petition to vacate the probate order on April 22, 1952, alleging extrinsic fraud due to his omission from the petition and lack of notice. The Court of First Instance of Batangas, finding that the probate order was obtained through extrinsic fraud, vacated the order. Antonio Asi appealed this decision directly to the Supreme Court. 3. The Petition: Antonio Asi, the appellant, argues that the Court of First Instance improperly vacated the probate order. His primary contentions are that the court acquired jurisdiction through newspaper publication despite the lack of personal notice, and that Soriano's petition for relief was filed out of time. The Supreme Court addresses these arguments, clarifying that Soriano's petition for relief assumes the court's jurisdiction and that the six-month period for filing such a petition is counted from the entry of the order, not its rendition. The Court affirms that the fraud was extrinsic, as it prevented Soriano from having his day in court, and thus upholds the lower court's decision vacating the probate decree.
Issue(s)
Whether the Court of First Instance acquired jurisdiction over the case despite the lack of personal notice to Emilio Soriano. Whether the petition for relief was filed within the reglementary period. Whether the fraud practiced upon Emilio Soriano was extrinsic.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance, holding that the order vacating the probate decree was correct. The Court found that Emilio Soriano was fraudulently deprived of his day in court and that he seasonably applied for relief.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of jurisdiction: The Court clarified that Emilio Soriano did not question the jurisdiction of the probate court; rather, his petition for relief on the ground of fraud precisely assumed that the court had jurisdiction to issue the order complained of. Without jurisdiction, the order would be a total nullity, and no petition for relief would be required. The argument regarding newspaper publication as a basis for jurisdiction was deemed improperly raised in this context. On the timeliness of the petition for relief: The Court held that the petition for relief was filed within the reglementary period. Appellant incorrectly computed the six-month period from the rendition of the judgment. The law, specifically Section 3 of Rule 38, mandates that the period should be counted from the entry of the judgment or order. Since the probate order of October 10, 1951, could be entered at the earliest on November 9, 1951 (after the 30-day period for appeal or motion for new trial), the petition for relief filed on April 22, 1952, was within the six months allowed by law. On the nature of the fraud: The Court unequivocally stated that the fraud practiced upon Emilio Soriano was collateral or extrinsic. This fraud was not on a matter raised, controverted, or decided in the probate order itself. Instead, it was entirely foreign to the issue of the due execution of the will, which was the subject of the probate proceedings. Fraud that prevents a party from having a trial, as in this case where Emilio Soriano was deprived of his opportunity to object, has been consistently ruled as extrinsic.
Main Doctrine
A petition for relief from judgment obtained by extrinsic fraud is timely filed if filed within sixty days after the petitioner learns of the judgment and not more than six months after the entry of such judgment, counting the six-month period from the entry of judgment, not from its rendition.