Jimenez v. Francisco
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioner Liberato C. Jimenez was appointed Temporary Chief of the Investigation Section of the Philippine Veterans Board with an annual salary of P4,800, effective October 1, 1949. This appointment was authorized by the Bureau of Civil Service under Section 682 of the Revised Administrative Code, with the condition that it would not extend beyond thirty days from the receipt of certification of eligibles. Jimenez applied for and was granted a leave of absence from June 20, 1951, to August 3, 1951. While on leave, he was informed by the Acting Chairman of the Philippine Veterans Board that his services would terminate effective August 3, 1951, pursuant to a Board resolution dated July 20, 1951, which also promoted Juan L. Gacad to the position. Procedural History: Jimenez sought reinstatement, receiving an endorsement from the Secretary of National Defense to that effect. However, the Philippine Veterans Board indicated that criminal charges were being prepared against Jimenez, and his reinstatement request was held in abeyance pending the outcome of the investigation. Subsequently, the Secretary of National Defense ordered Jimenez's reinstatement, though not in his former position. The Acting Chairman of the Board responded that separation was not feasible and no suitable opening existed. The Civil Service Commission certified Jimenez's eligibility for appointment to any suitable position occupied by a non-eligible. The Court of First Instance of Manila ordered the respondent Chairman of the Veterans Board to prepare an appointment for Jimenez. The respondents appealed this decision to the Court of Appeals, which, upon realizing purely legal questions were involved, elevated the case to the Supreme Court. The respondents later appointed Jimenez as Supervisor of Field Team, leading to a motion to dismiss the appeal, which was denied by the Court of Appeals. The Petition: This case reaches the Supreme Court to determine the legality of Jimenez's separation from service due to a lack of civil service eligibility, which made way for the promotional appointment of an eligible individual. The core issue revolves around the interpretation of Section 682 of the Revised Administrative Code concerning temporary appointments. The petitioner argues that upon becoming a civil service eligible, he was entitled to permanent appointment. The respondents contend that Jimenez's temporary appointment was limited in duration and that his removal was legal, as a temporary appointment cannot ripen into a permanent one, and the appointing power retains discretion in selecting permanent employees. The Supreme Court is asked to rule on whether Jimenez's separation was lawful and if he is entitled to reinstatement and back pay.
Issue(s)
Whether the separation of a temporary employee, who subsequently became a civil service eligible, from his position is legal, especially when an eligible was appointed to the said position. Whether a temporary appointment, even if extended beyond the statutory period, can ripen into a permanent appointment. Whether the appointing power has the discretion to choose who to appoint among civil service eligibles.
Ruling
The appealed decision is reversed, and the petition for mandamus is dismissed. The separation of the petitioner from the service was legal.
Ratio Decidendi
On the legality of separation and the nature of temporary appointments: The Court held that petitioner's separation from service was legal. His appointment as Temporary Chief of the Investigation Section was governed by Section 682 of the Revised Administrative Code, which explicitly limits temporary appointments to a period not exceeding three months after the receipt of the certification of eligibles. The petitioner's continuance in office beyond this period was an extension of grace. The Court reiterated the principle that when a position in the classified service is filled by a non-eligible, the appointment is limited to the period necessary to secure a qualified civil service eligible, and in no case longer than three months. The implied dismissal occurred when an eligible was appointed to the position. The Court cited Leonilo Paña, et al. vs. City Mayor Medina, et al. and Orais, et al. vs. Ribo et al. to support this reasoning. On whether a temporary appointment ripens into a permanent one: The Court ruled that a temporary appointment does not ripen into a permanent one. The petitioner's claim that he was entitled to a permanent appointment after becoming a civil service eligible was not sanctioned by law or regulation. The power to appoint is discretionary, and mere certification as a civil service eligible does not guarantee an appointment. The Civil Service Commission only certifies qualifications, not appointments. American court decisions were cited, holding that a temporary appointment cannot mature into permanence and does not preclude the appointing power from selecting an employee for a permanent position. On the discretionary power of the appointing authority: The Court affirmed that the power to appoint is essentially discretionary. The appointing power has the right to choose freely who is best qualified for any competitive position in the Civil Service. The Civil Service Commission's role is to certify eligibles, not to insure appointments. The Court emphasized that the petitioner's removal was effective August 3, 1951, and he was not entitled to emoluments thereafter, as his removal was deemed legal.
Main Doctrine
A temporary appointment, even if extended beyond the statutory period, does not ripen into a permanent appointment, and the holder may be removed at any time, especially when an eligible is available or appointed to the position.