Mandian v. Leong
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Plaintiff-appellee Mandian (Manoba), widow of Leon Lung, sued defendant-appellant Dionisio Leong, her stepson, in the Court of First Instance of Davao. Mandian alleged that Dionisio usurped a parcel of land and coconut plantation registered in her name. She sought an accounting of fruits, damages, and attorney's fees. Dionisio denied usurpation, claiming he administered the property as part of his late father's estate by agreement with Mandian. Procedural History: Celestino Leong, Dionisio's brother, intervened as a defendant. Celestino claimed the property was acquired during his father's second marriage to Mandian but titled in her name because his father was not a Filipino citizen. Celestino also filed a cross-claim against Dionisio, alleging Dionisio's exclusive possession of the estate and failure to share its fruits with co-heirs, praying for an accounting and distribution. Dionisio failed to answer Celestino's cross-claim within the prescribed period, leading the trial court to declare him in default on July 2, 1955. Dionisio's motion for reconsideration, arguing the default period should be counted from the admission of the intervention rather than service of the answer, was denied. Dionisio then appealed this denial to the Supreme Court. The Petition: The appeal is brought before the Supreme Court following the denial of Dionisio Leong's motion for reconsideration of the order declaring him in default. The appellant argues that his period to answer the cross-claim should commence from the court's admission of the intervention, not from the date of service of the answer. However, the Supreme Court notes that an order of default is interlocutory and subject to modification before final judgment. Furthermore, the Court emphasizes that an appeal from an order of default is premature unless preceded by a motion under Rule 38 to set aside the default, which Dionisio has not filed, as his motion for reconsideration did not sufficiently allege surprise, fraud, mistake, or excusable neglect. The appeal is therefore dismissed as premature.
Issue(s)
Whether the appeal from the order of default is premature. Whether the motion for reconsideration filed by Dionisio Leong qualified as a motion to set aside an order of default under Rule 38.
Ruling
The appeal is dismissed. The trial court is ordered to proceed with the hearing of the case, including the cross-claim against appellant Dionisio Leong.
Ratio Decidendi
On the prematurity of the appeal: The Court held that the order declaring appellant Dionisio Leong in default is an interlocutory and preliminary order, which remains under the control of the court and may be modified or rescinded at any time before final judgment. Therefore, an appeal from such an order is premature and improper. The Court cited Sitchon vs. Prov. Sheriff of Occidental Negros (80 Phil., 397) for the principle that interlocutory orders are not appealable. Furthermore, the Court noted that even if Dionisio were in default, the cross-plaintiff might fail to establish his claims, leading to the dismissal of the cross-claim, in which case Dionisio would have no cause for complaint. The appeal at this stage was thus considered improper. On the nature of the motion for reconsideration: The Court clarified that for a defendant to appeal an order of default, it is a prerequisite to file a motion under Rule 38 asking that the order be set aside. Such a motion must allege grounds like surprise, fraud, mistake, or excusable neglect. Dionisio's petition for reconsideration on July 11, 1955, did not aver these specific grounds. Even if it were treated as a Rule 38 motion, the appellant should still await the judgment on the merits of the cross-claim before appealing. The Court cited Lim Toco vs. Go Fay (80 Phil., 166) and other cases for the requirement of filing a motion to set aside the default order before an appeal can be perfected. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed for being premature and for failing to comply with the procedural prerequisites for appealing an order of default.
Main Doctrine
An appeal from an order declaring a party in default is premature and improper if filed before a final judgment on the merits is rendered, especially when the motion for reconsideration did not sufficiently allege grounds for setting aside a default order under Rule 38.