Estayo v. De Guzman
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: This case originated from an election protest filed by Eugenio Estayo against Jose L. de Guzman concerning the 1937 elections for a position on the provincial board of Pangasinan. The Court of First Instance of Pangasinan ruled in favor of Estayo, declaring him the duly elected member and ordering de Guzman to pay costs. 2. Procedural History: Jose L. de Guzman appealed the Court of First Instance's decision to the Court of Appeals, filing an appeal bond secured by a mortgage on five parcels of land. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's judgment. The Supreme Court denied de Guzman's petition for review, and entry of judgment was made. Subsequently, de Guzman filed a petition for the cancellation of the appeal bond. Eugenio Estayo, meanwhile, filed a bill of costs. The parties engaged in a protracted dispute over the assessment and approval of these costs, with numerous filings and agreements to defer consideration. The Court of First Instance eventually ordered the release of the appeal bond, which Estayo's heirs appealed. 3. The Petition: The protestant-appellant, representing the estate of the deceased Eugenio Estayo, appealed the order releasing the appeal bond. The core of the appeal centers on whether the protestant-appellant had pursued the taxation and approval of the bill of costs within the legally prescribed five-year period for executing a judgment. The appellant argued that the political nature of the case and the Japanese occupation excused the delay, while the appellee contended that the statutory period had lapsed, rendering the appeal bond eligible for cancellation. The Supreme Court also considered the prescriptive period for enforcing the mortgage on the bondsmen's property under the New Civil Code.
Issue(s)
Whether the protestant-appellant lost his right to have the bill of costs taxed and approved due to failure to act within the five-year period for execution of judgment. Whether the encumbrance on the five parcels of land mortgaged by the bondsmen for the appeal bond may be cancelled.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the order appealed from as to the release of the appeal bond and modified it to grant authority to the Registrar of Deeds to cancel the memorandum of encumbrance on the five parcels of land. The Court ruled that the protestant-appellant had slept on his rights and neglected to execute the judgment within the five-year period from its entry.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Supreme Court held that the protestant-appellant lost his right to have the bill of costs taxed and approved due to his failure to act within the five-year period for the execution of judgment. Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a judgment may be executed on motion within five years from its entry. Costs and incidental expenses are part of the judgment, and the prevailing party must submit the itemized bill to the clerk of court for taxation. In this case, entry of judgment was made on August 6, 1940, but the bill of costs was only filed on November 1, 1946, and further action was deferred by agreement. The subsequent actions by the protestant were well beyond the five-year period. The Court rejected arguments that the Japanese occupation or the Moratorium Law excused the delay, stating that the motion for taxation of costs was not an execution of the judgment involving political rights and that even with the Moratorium Law's suspension periods considered, the actions were still time-barred. The protestant slept on his rights and neglected to execute the judgment within the prescribed period. On Issue 2: The Supreme Court ruled that the encumbrance on the five parcels of land mortgaged by the bondsmen for the appeal bond may be cancelled. The Court applied Article 1142 of the New Civil Code, which states that a mortgage action prescribes after ten years. The period for enforcing the mortgage became effective on August 6, 1940, when the entry of judgment was made. By August 30, 1950, when the New Civil Code took effect, more than ten years had elapsed since the action to enforce the mortgage became effective. Therefore, the prescriptive period under the New Civil Code had already run, allowing for the cancellation of the encumbrance on the properties.
Main Doctrine
The Supreme Court affirmed that a judgment, including the award of costs and incidental expenses, must be executed within five years from its entry. Failure to file a bill of costs and press for its taxation within this period results in the loss of the right to enforce it by motion. Furthermore, the Court applied the ten-year prescriptive period for mortgage actions under the New Civil Code to the appeal bond, allowing for its cancellation after the prescriptive period had elapsed.