Soriano v. Ong
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Florencia R. Soriano and her brother Teodoro R. Soriano were co-owners, and their father Ramon Soriano was the usufructuary, of two lots in Manila. On November 29, 1943, they sold these lots to Ong Hoo for P160,000, with P90,000 paid at the time of sale and P70,000 on December 4, 1943. Ong Hoo registered the sale on January 17, 1944, and a new title was issued in his name. Ramon Soriano died on September 15, 1944, and Teodoro R. Soriano died on September 5, 1946. Florencia R. Soriano, as their sole heir, succeeded to their rights. On January 16, 1946, Ong Hoo sold the lots to Chung Te, Ching Leng, and Ching Tan. This sale was registered on January 22, 1946, and a new title was issued in their names. Procedural History: Florencia R. Soriano filed an action seeking to declare the original sale and the subsequent transfer null and void, arguing that the vendees and transferees were Chinese citizens and thus incapable of acquiring ownership of private agricultural lands. She prayed for the declaration of nullity of the sale and for her declaration as owner upon reimbursement of the sale price. The defendants argued that the complaint stated no cause of action, that the plaintiff participated in an illegal contract, that they were innocent purchasers for value, and that the sale occurred during the Japanese regime when the Philippine Constitution was not in force. The Court of First Instance of Manila dismissed the action, citing the principle of pari delicto and relevant jurisprudence. The Petition: The plaintiff-appellant argued that the pari delicto principle was inapplicable because the violated law was unclear and subject to mistake. She also contended that, in line with the State's policy to retain lands for its citizens, she should be allowed to recover the property, drawing a parallel to homestead sales. The defendants-appellees maintained their position that the sale was valid and that they were innocent purchasers.
Issue(s)
Whether the principle of in pari delicto applies to a vendor seeking to recover land sold to an alien in violation of the Constitutional prohibition. Whether the rules allowing recovery of homesteads sold in violation of the Public Land Law should be applied by analogy to Constitutional violations regarding alien landholdings.
Ruling
The judgment dismissing the action is affirmed. The sale is not annulled at the instance of the vendor. The State alone has the recourse to declare the sale null and void and to initiate proceedings for escheat.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Supreme Court held that the principle of in pari delicto is fully applicable to the vendors. The constitutional prohibition against the acquisition of agricultural lands by aliens is absolute and unconditional, and it does not contain any saving clause for those who claim ignorance of its meaning or implications. The Court rejected the appellant's argument that the provision was doubtful, emphasizing the general rule of law that knowledge of the law is presumed. Since both the citizen vendor and the alien vendee participated in a contract that violates the fundamental law, they are in equal fault. Consequently, the judiciary will not afford a remedy to the vendor to undo a voluntary act of disposal that was performed in violation of the Constitution. The Court maintains the status quo between the parties, leaving the legal consequences of the violation to be addressed by the State. On Issue 2: The Court explicitly distinguished the constitutional prohibition from the restrictions found in the Public Land Law regarding homesteads. The Public Land Law, specifically Sections 118 and 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, contains express provisions intended to conserve ownership in the homesteader or his heirs, such as the right to repurchase within five years and the prohibition of sale without administrative consent. In contrast, the Constitution merely prohibits the acquisition of land by foreigners and is entirely silent on the civil effects or results of a violation of this prohibition between private parties. If a citizen voluntarily chooses to dispose of his property to an alien, there is no statutory or constitutional mandate requiring the return of that property to the vendor. The Court noted that in jurisdictions with similar prohibitions, the vendor has no recourse against the vendee, and the power to declare a forfeiture or escheat resides solely with the State through proceedings in the nature of 'office found.' Therefore, the courts cannot extend the remedy of recovery to the vendor absent legislative or constitutional authorization, as determining the policy for such violations is beyond judicial authority.
Main Doctrine
The principle of pari delicto applies to both parties in a sale of agricultural land by a Filipino citizen to an alien, where both parties are aware of the constitutional prohibition. The State alone has the recourse to declare the sale null and void and to initiate proceedings for escheat. The vendor cannot recover the property.