Angel Jose Realty Corporation, Inc. v. Alconcel
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: The Sheriff of Manila filed an action of interpleader to determine the rightful claimant to P783.85 in his possession, proceeds from a writ of execution in criminal case No. 13731. Soledad Alconcel and Wilhelmina Carlos claimed the sum by virtue of a judgment in the said criminal case, based on a counter-bond they executed for Jose Romualdez. Angel Jose Realty Corporation, Inc. (AJRCI) claimed the sum as unpaid rentals for an apartment occupied by Romualdez from July to September 30, 1955. The properties sold in execution were movable properties of Romualdez located in the apartment. Procedural History: AJRCI's petition to intervene in the interpleader case was denied. AJRCI then filed a civil case for back rentals against Romualdez, obtained a judgment, and secured a writ of execution on March 10, 1956, ordering the sheriff to deliver the P783.85 to AJRCI. The lower court ruled in favor of Alconcel and Carlos, finding their claim, arising from a writ of execution dated September 10, 1955, had preference over AJRCI's claim based on a writ dated March 10, 1956, citing Article 2244(7) of the Civil Code. The Petition: AJRCI appealed the lower court's decision, arguing its claim for unpaid rentals should be considered under Article 2241(12) of the Civil Code, which grants preference to credits for rent upon the personal property of the lessee.
Issue(s)
Whether the claim of Soledad Alconcel and Wilhelmina Carlos, arising from a writ of execution in a criminal case, has preference over the claim of Angel Jose Realty Corporation, Inc. for unpaid rentals from the proceeds of the sale of movable properties. Whether Article 2241 or Article 2244 of the Civil Code is applicable to the case.
Ruling
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Angel Jose Realty Corporation, Inc. The judgment appealed from was set aside, and a new one was entered ordering the sheriff to deliver the disputed sum to Angel Jose Realty Corporation, Inc.
Ratio Decidendi
On the preference of credits and applicable law: The Court held that the claim of Angel Jose Realty Corporation, Inc. for unpaid rentals has preference over the claim of Soledad Alconcel and Wilhelmina Carlos. While Alconcel and Carlos's claim arose from an earlier writ of execution dated September 10, 1955, AJRCI's claim for rents from July to September 1955, which originated from a writ dated March 10, 1956, is for rents due on the apartment. The disputed sum of P783.85 represents the proceeds from the sale of movable properties found in the leased apartment, which were owned by the lessee, Jose Romualdez. Therefore, Article 2241 of the Civil Code, which specifically addresses preferred claims with reference to specific movable property of the debtor, is applicable. This article grants preference to credits for rent for one year upon the personal property of the lessee existing on the immovable leased. The Court clarified that Article 2244, which applies to 'other property' of the debtor, is not applicable in this instance because the funds in dispute are derived from specific movable property. On the application of Article 2241(12): The Court found the contention of AJRCI to be well-founded. Citing the case of Mcmicking vs. Padern, Moreno, Jimenez and Co., the Court reiterated that credits for rents due on an immovable property, when arising from the use and occupation of the building, have preference over other claims when the funds are derived from the personal property of the lessee. In this case, the P783.85 came from the sale of movables belonging to Romualdez, who was the lessee of the apartment for which AJRCI claimed unpaid rentals. Thus, AJRCI's credit for rent falls under the purview of Article 2241(12) of the Civil Code, granting it preference over the claims of Alconcel and Carlos.
Main Doctrine
Under Article 2241 of the Civil Code, credits for rent for one year upon the personal property of the lessee existing on the immovable leased have preference over other claims, even if those other claims arose from an earlier writ of execution, when the disputed funds originate from the sale of such movable property.