Barnes v. Reyes
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Plaintiff-appellee, Warner Barnes and Co., Ltd., filed an action for foreclosure of mortgage against defendants-appellants, Guillermo C. Reyes, et al., on August 20, 1954. The deed of mortgage was attached as Annex "A" to the complaint. Procedural History: After being granted an extension, the appellants filed an answer on September 30, 1954, admitting paragraph 1 of the complaint and stating they were without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the remainder of the complaint. They also reserved the right to present an amended answer with special defenses and counterclaim. As no amended answer was filed, the appellee moved for judgment on the pleadings on November 15, 1954, arguing the answer failed to tender an issue. The lower court granted the motion on December 28, 1954, and rendered judgment in favor of the appellee on December 29, 1954, holding that the denial of material allegations under the guise of lack of knowledge constituted a general denial. The Petition: The defendants appealed the decision, raising the sole issue of whether an allegation of want of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to material averments constitutes a mere general denial warranting judgment on the pleadings or is sufficient to tender a triable issue.
Issue(s)
Whether an allegation of want of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of material averments in a complaint amounts to a mere general denial warranting judgment on the pleadings. Whether such an allegation is sufficient to tender a triable issue.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court, holding that the appellants' answer was insufficient to tender a triable issue and thus warranted a judgment on the pleadings.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of whether an allegation of want of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief amounts to a mere general denial warranting judgment on the pleadings: The Court held that while Section 7 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court allows a defendant to state they are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of a material averment, and this has the effect of a denial, this rule must be availed of with sincerity and in good faith. The Court cited Kirachbaum Eschmann to explain that such denials should be definite and certain, leaving no doubt as to what is admitted, denied, or covered by the denial of knowledge. In this foreclosure suit, where the deed of mortgage was attached to the complaint, it was difficult to believe that the appellants could not have had knowledge or information regarding the allegations of indebtedness, the mortgage, partial payments, defaults, and covenants. The Court emphasized that an "unexplained denial of information and belief of a matter of record, the means of information concerning which are within the control of the pleader, or are readily accessible to him, is evasive and is insufficient to constitute an effective denial," citing 41 Am. Juris., 399. On the issue of whether such an allegation is sufficient to tender a triable issue: The Court found that the appellants' answer, filed after an extension and without the promised amended answer, suggested a lack of defense or a desire to delay proceedings. The Court reiterated that a court will not permit its process to be trifled with by pleadings that are "palpably untrue" or that are intended to confuse the adverse party or cause delay. The rule allowing denial of knowledge does not apply where the fact asserted is plainly and necessarily within the defendant's knowledge, making the averment of ignorance "palpably untrue," as stated in Icle Plant Equipment Co. vs. Martocello.
Main Doctrine
A denial of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of material averments in a complaint, when the facts are plainly and necessarily within the defendant's knowledge or readily accessible to them, is considered evasive and insufficient to tender a triable issue, thus warranting a judgment on the pleadings.