Subido v. Lacson
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioners, licensed meat vendors, sought a refund of meat inspection fees collected by the City of Manila under Ordinance No. 2991 from 1946 to 1951. The Secretary of Justice ruled Ordinance No. 2991 illegal and void in 1951, leading the City to stop its enforcement. Petitioners filed claims for refund. The Auditor General authorized the refund, regardless of whether fees were paid with or without protest. The Municipal Board, through Ordinance No. 3538 (1952-1953 budget), appropriated funds for these refunds. However, the City Treasurer initially stated he would only pay claims within two years of filing, based on an Auditor General's indorsement. Subsequently, the Mayor suspended payments due to an investigation of alleged lost public documents related to the refunds. The Auditor General later revised its ruling, allowing refunds within five years from filing, provided dealers were not officially advised of the earlier two-year limitation before a certain date. Petitioners were advised of the earlier ruling on December 18, 1952. Some claims within the two-year period were paid, but others, particularly those within the five-year period, remained unpaid due to the suspension order. Procedural History: The Court of First Instance dismissed the action, ruling that the City Mayor and Treasurer could not be sued directly as the City of Manila, a public corporation, was the real party in interest, and any judgment against the officials would be unenforceable against the City's funds. Petitioners appealed. The Petition: Petitioners sought a writ of mandamus to compel the City Auditor and City Treasurer to pass in audit and pay their claims for refund, and to prohibit the Mayor from enforcing his order suspending action on the claims.
Issue(s)
Whether the City of Manila is the indispensable real party in interest, precluding a suit against its officials. Whether mandamus is the proper remedy to compel the payment of the refund claims. Whether the Mayor's order suspending the payment of refunds constituted a lawful exercise of executive control or an abuse of discretion.
Ruling
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of First Instance. It ordered the issuance of a writ of mandamus against the City Mayor to prevent him from suspending or interfering with the approval and payment of the petitioners' claims, and against the City Treasurer to compel him to pay the claims after voucher approval. The action against the City Auditor was dismissed.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of the City being the indispensable real party in interest: The Court held that while ordinarily the City would be the real party in interest, the situation here was different. The claims had been favorably passed upon and authorized for payment by the Auditor General, whose decision was confirmed by the President. Furthermore, the Municipal Board had approved an appropriation for the refunds in Ordinance No. 3538. This acquiescence by the City to the refund, evidenced by the appropriation, meant that the City was no longer the sole real party in interest. The officials refusing to perform their ministerial acts became the real parties in interest, subject to mandamus. On the issue of mandamus being the proper remedy: The Court found that mandamus was the appropriate and more speedy remedy. The claims had been authorized by the Auditor General and appropriated by the Municipal Board. An ordinary action for refund would be superfluous and cause unnecessary delay. When an officer refuses or neglects to perform a duty imposed by law, mandamus lies to compel the execution of that ministerial act. The Court cited previous cases where mandamus was granted against officials refusing to perform their duties. On the issue of the Mayor's suspension order: The Court ruled that the Mayor's order suspending payments, while potentially justifiable initially due to suspicions of irregularities, ceased to have legal basis after an investigation found no such irregularities. The Court emphasized that executive control must be exercised in accordance with law and reason, not arbitrarily. The continued suspension, without valid grounds, constituted an abuse of discretion. The Mayor's assurance of resuming payments after investigation, coupled with the subsequent finding of no irregularities, made the continued suspension unlawful.
Main Doctrine
Mandamus lies against city officials to compel the payment of claims authorized by the Auditor General and appropriated by the Municipal Board, even if the City Mayor orders suspension, as such suspension may constitute an abuse of discretion when no legal grounds exist.