Abelow v. De la Riva
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Joseph Abelow filed an action of replevin against Jose de la Riva and Gonzalo G. Padua to recover personal properties. He secured an order for seizure and delivery of the properties upon posting a "bond for manual delivery of personal property" subscribed by Luzon Surety Co., Inc. Subsequently, upon submission of a counter-bond, the order of seizure was lifted, and the properties were returned. Procedural History: The replevin case resulted in a judgment absolving the defendants, but requiring the plaintiff to pay damages and attorney's fees to San Ildefonso Lumber Co. (which was included as an additional defendant). The Court of Appeals affirmed this judgment. A writ of execution against the plaintiff was returned unsatisfied. The defendants then prayed for an alias writ of execution against Luzon Surety Co., Inc., the surety on the replevin bond. The Petition: Luzon Surety Co., Inc. objected to the alias writ, arguing that the final judgment contained no pronouncement against it, that it had no notice of the claim against the plaintiff before the judgment became final, and that defendants failed to submit their claim against the surety and give it notice thereof before the entry of final judgment, as required by Rule 62. Despite these arguments, the trial court decreed execution against Luzon Surety.
Issue(s)
Whether an alias writ of execution may be issued against a surety on a replevin bond after the judgment has become final, without a prior order against the surety entered with notice. Whether the defendants' failure to notify the surety of their claim before the final judgment bars recovery against the surety.
Ruling
The Supreme Court revoked the appealed order directing the issuance of an alias writ of execution against Luzon Surety Co., Inc. The Court held that the judgment under execution contained no directive for the surety to pay, and the defendants failed to make any claim against it or notify it before such judgment had become final.
Ratio Decidendi
On the propriety of an alias writ of execution against the surety: The Court held that the procedure for enforcing the surety's liability under a bond for delivery of personal property is governed by Section 10, Rule 62 in connection with Section 20, Rule 59 of the Rules of Court. Applying these sections, the Court reiterated its consistent holding that a surety may only be held liable if, prior to the finality of the judgment, an order against the surety is entered after a hearing where the surety was given notice. The Court emphasized that after the judgment becomes final, it is too late to file a claim against the surety. In this case, the judgment under execution did not contain any directive for the surety to pay, and no such order was secured against the surety before the judgment became final. Therefore, an alias writ of execution against the surety was improper. On the necessity of notice to the surety before final judgment: The Court found that the defendants failed to make any claim against the surety or notify it of their claim before the judgment had become final. While the appellees asserted that the surety had been notified, the Court clarified that such notification occurred after the judgment had become final, not before its promulgation. The Court distinguished this situation from cases where timely notice was given, and explicitly abandoned the ruling in Florentino vs. Domagdag which might have suggested otherwise, in favor of later adjudications like Visayan Surety and Liberty Construction Supply. This failure to provide timely notice and secure an order against the surety before final judgment was fatal to the defendants' claim against Luzon Surety.
Main Doctrine
A surety on a replevin bond may only be held liable if, before the judgment becomes final, an order against the surety is entered after a hearing with notice to the surety. After the judgment becomes final, it is too late to file a claim against the surety.