Alonzo v. Rosario
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioners (defendants) and respondents (plaintiffs) were involved in an action for partition of property before the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur. Petitioners claimed the property was paraphernal to Juana Alonzo, thus respondents had no interest. Procedural History: The trial court declared the property conjugal and ordered partition. Petitioners' motion to set aside the decision due to mistake and excusable negligence was denied for lack of an affidavit of merits. A subsequent motion for reconsideration was also denied. Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Petition: The Court of Appeals dismissed petitioners' appeal. Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court seeking to set aside the resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Issue(s)
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the appeal. Whether the period for filing the appellant's brief was interrupted by the pendency of a motion to dismiss the appeal.
Ruling
The resolution of the Court of Appeals dated April 12, 1957, dismissing the appeal, is set aside. The case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for decision on the merits.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the appeal: The Supreme Court found the denial of the petition to be improper. The Court noted that the counsel for petitioners failed to appear at the initial trial due to illness, leading to the presentation of evidence by respondents and a subsequent decision against petitioners. A motion to set aside this decision was denied for not being accompanied by an affidavit of merits. The appeal to the Court of Appeals was then dismissed. On the issue of whether the period for filing the appellant's brief was interrupted by the pendency of a motion to dismiss the appeal: The Supreme Court held that the period consumed during the pendency of the motion to dismiss should be excluded from the period given to petitioners to submit their brief. The Court reasoned that under Section 4, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, a motion to dismiss interrupts the time to plead in courts of first instance. By analogy, the same principle should apply to appeals in the Court of Appeals, as the filing of a brief would be unnecessary if the motion to dismiss the appeal is granted. The Court cited Torres vs. Ribo in support of the principle that a motion to dismiss suspends the period to answer until decided. In this case, the 45-day period to file the brief would have expired on March 22, 1957, but the resolution denying the motion to dismiss only came on April 12, 1957. Therefore, the brief filed on April 17, 1957, should be deemed presented in due time.
Main Doctrine
A motion to dismiss an appeal, filed in good faith, suspends the period within which the appellant should file their brief until the motion is finally decided, as the filing of the brief would be unnecessary if the motion to dismiss is granted.