Porras v. Abellana
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Newspapers reported anomalies in the custody of records under the finance and supply officer of the Davao City police department. Consequently, the Mayor of Davao City directed the Chief of Police to relieve Capt. Petronilo S. Cariaga as finance and supply officer and assign him to field duty. Procedural History: The Chief of Police questioned the Mayor's order, asserting it was beyond the Mayor's authority as the organization and disposition of the police force were vested in the Chief of Police under Section 21 of the city charter. The Court of First Instance of Davao, however, held that the Mayor's power of control under Section 9 of the charter justified the order and granted a petition for mandamus directing the Chief of Police to comply. The Petition: The Chief of Police appealed the decision of the Court of First Instance.
Issue(s)
Whether the Mayor of Davao City has the authority to order the relief and transfer of the finance and supply officer of the police department. Whether the duties of the Chief of Police in this regard are discretionary and may not be compelled by mandamus. Whether there exists another speedy, adequate, and plain remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance, holding that the Mayor has the authority to order the transfer of the finance and supply officer.
Ratio Decidendi
On the Mayor's authority to order the transfer: The Court held that the Mayor, as the chief executive of the city government, possesses immediate control over the executive and administrative functions of the different departments, as provided in Section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 51. This power of control was elucidated as the authority to alter, modify, or set aside what a subordinate officer had done and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. Given that anomalies were reported concerning the custody of records under the finance and supply officer, the Mayor was justified in exercising his power of control to order the transfer of Capt. Cariaga to field duty. This action was deemed a proper exercise of the Mayor's oversight function to ensure the proper administration of city affairs. On whether the duties are discretionary and controllable by mandamus: The Court found that the argument that the duties are discretionary and thus not controllable by mandamus was not applicable. The Chief of Police was not being compelled to perform a distinct duty but rather to execute an order from the Mayor. The duty to promptly and faithfully execute all orders of the Mayor is expressly provided for in Section 21, paragraph (d) of Commonwealth Act No. 51. Therefore, the Chief of Police was legally bound to comply with the Mayor's directive. On the existence of another speedy, adequate, and plain remedy: The Court rejected the contention that Republic Act No. 557 provided an alternative remedy. The investigation provided for in that Act pertains to charges preferred by the city mayor against members of the police department. In this case, the Mayor acted under his power of control to address irregularities. The transfer of the officer implicated in or associated with the irregularities was considered the most expedient remedy, which an investigation by the city council would not adequately or speedily address. Thus, mandamus was deemed the appropriate remedy to compel compliance with the Mayor's lawful order.
Main Doctrine
The power of control vested in a city mayor over the different departments of the city government includes the authority to alter, modify, or set aside actions of subordinate officers and to substitute his own judgment, thereby allowing the mayor to order the transfer of a finance and supply officer to field duty.