People v. Fule

G.R. No. L-12915 · 1959-07-28 · J. BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.: · Primary: Criminal; Secondary: Remedial
REITERATION

Facts

1. The Antecedents: The case involves an information for serious oral defamation filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Laguna against Jose Fule. The alleged offense occurred on December 20, 1956. 2. Procedural History: An information was initially filed with the deputy clerk of court of the second branch of the Court of First Instance of Laguna on June 18, 1957. Subsequently, it was transmitted to the third branch, as per Administrative Order No. 149, series of 1955, which designated the third branch to handle cases from the Municipality of Alaminos where the offense was committed. The accused filed a motion to quash on July 27, 1957, arguing the action had prescribed because the information was filed on June 20, 1957, after the six-month prescriptive period. The Provincial Fiscal opposed this, asserting the filing date was June 18, 1957. The trial court, on July 29, 1957, sustained the motion to quash, dismissing the information. A motion for reconsideration was denied on August 24, 1957, leading to the instant appeal. 3. The Petition: The People of the Philippines, through the Provincial Fiscal, appealed the trial court's order of dismissal. The core of the appeal revolves around whether the filing of the information with the deputy clerk of court of the second branch on June 18, 1957, constitutes a valid filing with the Court of First Instance of Laguna, thereby interrupting the prescriptive period. The appellant contends that a court, even with multiple branches, is a single entity, and filing with any branch or its deputy clerk should be considered a filing with the court itself, aligning with established jurisprudence that jurisdiction is vested in the court as a whole, not individual branches.

Issue(s)

Whether the filing of the information with the office of the deputy clerk of court of the second branch of the Court of First Instance of Laguna on June 18, 1957, interrupted the running of the prescriptive period for serious oral defamation, considering that the offense was allegedly committed on December 20, 1956, and the third branch of the same court had territorial jurisdiction. Whether the branches of the Court of First Instance are separate and independent courts for the purpose of filing actions.

Ruling

The Supreme Court set aside the order of dismissal and remanded the case to the court of origin for further proceedings. The Court ruled that the information was filed within the period prescribed by Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code.

Ratio Decidendi

On the issue of prescription and the filing of the information: The Court held that the filing of the information on June 18, 1957, with the office of the deputy clerk of court of the second branch was sufficient to interrupt the running of the prescriptive period. The offense was allegedly committed on December 20, 1956, and the prescriptive period for serious oral defamation, as provided by Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, is six months. Therefore, the last day for filing the information was June 18, 1957. The Court emphasized that the filing with the deputy clerk of court, even if not the branch with territorial jurisdiction, is considered a filing with the Court of First Instance of Laguna. This interpretation aligns with the doctrine that the Court of First Instance, despite being divided into branches, is a single entity for jurisdictional purposes. The subsequent transmission of the information to the correct branch does not negate the timely filing. On the nature of the branches of the Court of First Instance: The Court reiterated the principle that the branches of a Court of First Instance are not separate and distinct courts but are merely divisions of a single court. Jurisdiction is vested in the Court of First Instance of the province as a whole, not in any particular branch or judge. Administrative orders distributing cases among branches are for administrative convenience and do not limit or grant jurisdiction. Therefore, filing a pleading with any branch or its deputy clerk of court is considered a filing with the court itself. The trial court's premise that its branch was separate and independent from other branches for the purpose of filing actions was found to be incorrect. The Court cited its previous ruling in People vs. Del Rosario to support this interpretation, emphasizing that jurisdiction is vested in the court, not in the judges, and proceedings may continue before another branch.

Main Doctrine

The filing of an information with the office of the deputy clerk of court of one branch of the Court of First Instance, even if it is not the branch with territorial jurisdiction over the offense, interrupts the running of the prescriptive period, as the Court of First Instance, regardless of its branches, is considered a single entity for jurisdictional purposes.

Access audio review, related cases, codal links, and more.

Open LexMatePH →