Victory Shipping Lines v. Workmen's Compensation Commission
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: Pedro Icong, an employee of Victory Shipping Lines, Inc., was sleeping aboard the vessel M/V "Miss Leyte" when it caught fire on February 23, 1954. Awakened by the fire, Icong jumped overboard and has not been heard from since. He was unmarried, earning P4.00 daily with meals valued at P1.20. His father, Juan Icong, was a partial dependent and filed a notice of claim for death compensation with the Workmen's Compensation Commission and the petitioner on April 30, 1954. The petitioner reported the incident to the Commission on August 17, 1954. 2. Procedural History: The Workmen's Compensation Commission rendered an award in favor of respondent Juan Icong, granting P2,038.40 in death compensation, P200.00 for burial expenses, and P20.00 as legal fees. Victory Shipping Lines, Inc. appealed this award to the Supreme Court for review. 3. The Petition: The petitioner seeks review of the award, raising three points of law. First, it argues that Article 391 of the Civil Code, regarding the presumption of death for those unheard of for four years, was not applied, and Icong had only been missing for a few months. Second, it contends that Section 49 of Republic Act No. 772, which provides for the employer's right to notice and hearing, was disregarded, thus violating its right to due process. Third, the petitioner asserts that Pedro Icong's act of jumping overboard constituted notorious negligence, barring compensation, as a prudent person would have sought a life preserver and awaited instructions.
Issue(s)
Whether Article 391 of the Civil Code should have been applied to presume the death of Pedro Icong. Whether the petitioner was denied its right to notice and hearing as provided by Section 49 of Republic Act No. 772. Whether Pedro Icong's act of jumping overboard constituted notorious negligence, barring compensation.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Workmen's Compensation Commission. The award in favor of Juan Icong was upheld.
Ratio Decidendi
On the application of Article 391 of the Civil Code: The Court held that Article 391, which presumes death after four years of being unheard of, applies to vessels lost or missing at sea, where the vessel's fate is unknown. In this case, the vessel was not lost or missing; it was destroyed by fire and washed ashore. Therefore, the presumption of death under Article 391 was not applicable. Instead, the fact of death should be established by a preponderance of evidence. The Court cited the case of Madrigal Shipping Co., Inc. vs. Nieves Baens del Rosario to support this distinction. The Court further noted that when a person is last seen in imminent peril and has not been heard from since, an inference of immediate death may be drawn, which aligns with the preponderance of evidence rule. On the alleged lack of notice of hearing: The Court found that the petitioner failed to file the employer's report of the accident within the prescribed period under Section 45 of Act No. 4328, as amended by Republic Act No. 772. Neither did it assert its right to controvert the claim on jurisdictional grounds. Consequently, the employer could not subsequently complain that the law was strictly construed against it. The Court agreed with the Commission's conclusion that the petitioner implicitly admitted Pedro Icong's death by transmitting the employer's report, which listed him as the only casualty. On whether Pedro Icong's act constituted notorious negligence: The Court ruled that Pedro Icong's act of jumping overboard upon waking up to find the vessel on fire was not constitutive of gross negligence. It was correctly characterized by the respondent Commission as an act "rather impelled by fright or by the instinct of self-preservation." The Court emphasized that for an employee's negligence to exempt the employer from liability, it must be "notorious negligence," which must be proven by the employer. The presumption is that a laborer, when warned of danger, takes precautions by instinct of self-preservation, unless an intention to end his life is attributed to him.
Main Doctrine
The presumption of death under Article 391 of the Civil Code applies only when a vessel is lost or missing, not when it is destroyed by fire and the fate of a person who jumped overboard is determined by a preponderance of evidence. An employee's act of jumping overboard during a fire, impelled by fright or instinct of self-preservation, does not constitute gross negligence exempting the employer from liability.