Duran v. Pagarigan
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Paulina Duran filed an action to recover possession of 1.5 hectares of land, alleging that Bernardino Pagarigan usurped it in December 1948. The land was donated to her by her deceased grandfather, Antonio Duran. She claimed the portion was planted with 130 coconut trees yielding P500 annually and that despite demands, the defendant refused to vacate and recognize her ownership. Procedural History: The defendant, Bernardino Pagarigan, claimed he acquired the land by purchase from Ignacio Duran (plaintiff's father) in 1919 through a verbal contract, later ratified by a public instrument in 1936. He also asserted an amicable settlement in 1936 for P20, and that the plaintiff's cause of action was barred by the statute of limitations. The Court of First Instance of Cagayan, after trial, found that the defendant had been in possession since 1919 based on a Deed of Sale (Exhibit 1) and an exchange for a carabao valued at P80.00. The court noted that the defendant built his house on the land in 1936. It also found that while the plaintiff and her grandfather questioned the sale, the case was settled. The court ordered the defendant to deliver the portion of land in excess of what was covered by Exhibit 1, based on an ocular inspection, and to pay costs. The plaintiff filed a petition to set aside the judgment on November 30, 1954, alleging fraud, mistake, and excusable neglect, which was denied on January 7, 1955. A motion for reconsideration was also denied on February 10, 1955. The Petition: The plaintiff appealed the denial of her petition to set aside the judgment and the original judgment itself.
Issue(s)
Whether the plaintiff's petition to set aside the judgment was filed out of time. Whether the plaintiff's counsel's failure to notify her of the adverse judgment constitutes excusable negligence.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of First Instance and the order denying the petition to set aside the judgment, with costs against the appellant.
Ratio Decidendi
On the timeliness of the petition to set aside the judgment: The Court held that the plaintiff's "petition to set aside judgment" filed on November 30, 1954, was filed beyond the six-month period after the judgment was rendered on March 12, 1954. Therefore, the petition was filed out of time, and the lower court correctly denied it. The Court emphasized that Rule 38 of the Rules of Court prescribes specific periods for filing such petitions, which must be strictly adhered to. On excusable negligence: The Court ruled that the failure of the plaintiff's counsel to notify her on time of the adverse judgment, which resulted in the loss of her right to appeal, does not constitute excusable negligence. The Court reiterated the established principle that notice sent to the counsel of record is binding upon the client. Consequently, any neglect on the part of the counsel that leads to the loss of the client's right to appeal is not a valid ground for setting aside a judgment that is otherwise valid and regular on its face. The Court found no error in the lower court's denial of the petition based on this ground.
Main Doctrine
Notice sent to counsel of record is binding upon the client, and the resulting loss of the right to appeal due to the counsel's neglect does not constitute excusable negligence sufficient to set aside a judgment valid on its face.