People v. Labatete
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: The original information charged the accused with estafa for allegedly mortgaging improvements and products of his property to Genoveva Malinao as security for a loan, and subsequently mortgaging the same property, including the title, to the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation (RFC) without discharging the prior indebtedness. Procedural History: The accused pleaded not guilty to the original information. During the trial, the accused filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the facts alleged did not constitute a crime because only products and improvements were mortgaged, not the land itself, and the contract was not recorded. The trial court granted the motion, dismissing the information. The fiscal's motion for reconsideration was denied. Subsequently, the fiscal filed an amended information, alleging that the accused mortgaged the land itself, not just the products and improvements, to Genoveva Malinao. The trial court initially admitted the amended information but later reconsidered and denied its admission upon motion of the accused. The fiscal's subsequent motion to revoke this order was denied, leading to the present appeal. The Petition: The People of the Philippines appealed the order of the Court of First Instance denying the admission of the amended information, arguing that the denial was erroneous.
Issue(s)
Whether the trial court erred in denying the admission of the amended information on the ground that it would place the accused in double jeopardy. Whether the dismissal of the original information, upon motion of the accused, constitutes a waiver of the accused's constitutional right against double jeopardy.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the trial court denying the admission of the amended information. The Court held that the amendment was substantial, changing the nature of the offense charged, and that its admission would prejudice the accused's right against double jeopardy, as the original information had already been dismissed after the accused had pleaded and trial had commenced.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Supreme Court held that the trial court did not err in denying the admission of the amended information. Rule 106, Section 13, provides that an information may be amended in substance or form without leave of court before the defendant pleads, and thereafter, as to matters of form, by leave and at the discretion of the court, provided it can be done without prejudice to the rights of the defendant. The Court found that the amended information introduced a substantial change, alleging that the land itself, not just its improvements and products, was mortgaged, which alters the facts and the ground of responsibility for which the accused was indicted. Citing People vs. Zulueta, such a substantial amendment is not allowed after the trial has begun if it prejudices the defendant's rights. Admitting the amended information would prejudice the accused's right to the defense of double jeopardy, as he had already begun to be tried and was effectively acquitted by the dismissal of the original information. Therefore, the denial was proper. On Issue 2: The Supreme Court clarified that the dismissal of the original information, even if upon motion of the accused, constituted an acquittal, thereby triggering the protection against double jeopardy. The Court abandoned the principle from People vs. Salico that a dismissal upon motion of the defendant necessarily constitutes a waiver of double jeopardy. It explained that the phrase "without the express consent of the defendant" in Rule 113, Section 9, refers only to dismissals or terminations that are not convictions or acquittals. An acquittal, by its nature, is always to the express consent of the accused (i.e., ordinarily granted upon motion). The Court explicitly stated that a dismissal based on the insufficiency of facts to constitute a crime, after plea and commencement of trial, is a final judgment of acquittal. Therefore, the accused did not waive his constitutional right against double jeopardy by moving for dismissal, as that dismissal was an acquittal on the merits.
Main Doctrine
A substantial amendment to an information after the accused has pleaded and trial has commenced, which changes the nature of the offense or the facts constituting the offense, is not permissible and may prejudice the right of the accused against double jeopardy.