Lajom v. Leuterio
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Maximo Viola died on September 3, 1933. His legitimate children executed an agreement of partition of his estate on October 25, 1935, after judicial proceedings were closed on March 17, 1937. On March 17, 1939, Donato Lajom filed a complaint, later amended, praying to be declared a natural child of Maximo Viola, implicitly recognized, and thus a co-heir. He sought to nullify the partition agreement, demanding collation, payment of debts, accounting of fruits, and a new partition where he would receive one-seventh of the estate. Procedural History: The Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija sustained a demurrer to the amended complaint, holding that the matter required probate jurisdiction and that the Court of First Instance of Bulacan had already taken cognizance of the estate settlement. This was reversed by the Supreme Court, remanding the case for further proceedings. After trial, the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija rendered a decision in favor of Lajom, declaring him an acknowledged natural child, nullifying the partition, ordering collation, accounting of fruits, and a new partition. This decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-6457 on May 30, 1956. Upon remand, Lajom filed a motion for execution. The respondent Judge issued an order on October 30, 1956, annulling the partition, ordering collation, and appointing a judicial administrator. However, it specified that only one-half of 47 parcels from the partition agreement were definitively properties of Maximo Viola to be collated, leaving the determination of other properties for future hearing. Subsequently, when Rafael Viola filed his report, Lajom sought to include the fruits of a 215-hectare riceland allegedly donated to Rafael Viola. The respondent Judge denied this in an order dated October 30, 1957, stating the riceland was not put in issue by the pleadings and thus not covered by the decision. A motion for reconsideration was also denied on January 30, 1958, with the judge stating that any previous order implying collation of all properties was an error. The Petition: Lajom filed the present petition for certiorari and mandamus, seeking to set aside the orders of October 30, 1957, and January 30, 1958, and to reinstate the order of October 30, 1956, which he contended had already declared all properties, including donated ones, subject to collation and had become final.
Issue(s)
Whether the respondent Judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in issuing the orders of October 30, 1957, and January 30, 1958, by refusing to include the riceland donated to Rafael Viola in the collation and redistribution of the estate. Whether the order of October 30, 1956, which had become final, could be modified or reversed by subsequent orders of the respondent Judge. Whether the petitioner, having been preterited, converted the ordinary civil action into an intestate proceeding, thereby bringing all properties of the deceased under the court's jurisdiction.
Ruling
The petition is denied. The orders of October 30, 1957, and January 30, 1958, are sustained. The respondent Judge did not commit a grave abuse of discretion.
Ratio Decidendi
On the inclusion of the riceland: The Supreme Court held that the decision affirmed in G.R. No. L-6457 only ordained the collation of "properties in question." These properties were those described in the inventory attached to the petitioner's original complaint in case No. 8077, which did not include the 215-hectare riceland. The petitioner himself admitted that he did not know of this property at the time of filing his complaint and therefore could not have included it. Consequently, the riceland was not in question in that case and was not covered by the decision. The respondent Judge correctly ruled that properties not put in issue by the pleadings cannot be deemed embraced by the dispositive part of the decision requiring collation. On the finality and modification of the October 30, 1956 order: The Court clarified that the order of October 30, 1956, did not direct the collation of all properties of the deceased. It expressed a view that one-half of 47 parcels from the partition agreement were properties of the deceased to be collated, but it left the question of other properties open for future determination. Therefore, it was not accurate to claim that this order had become final and executory in a manner that prohibited subsequent clarification or correction regarding properties not previously in issue. Any order directing what was not required in the final decision, particularly concerning the riceland which had no pronouncement, would be in excess of jurisdiction. On the conversion of the action to an intestate proceeding: The contention that preterition converted the ordinary civil action into an intestate proceeding was deemed untenable. The Court distinguished between an ordinary civil action and a special proceeding for the settlement of a testate estate. In an ordinary civil action, the court's authority is limited to the properties described in the pleadings. The riceland in question was admittedly not included in the pleadings of Civil Case No. 8077. Therefore, without prejudice to the institution of separate intestate proceedings by the proper party, the ordinary civil action could not unilaterally expand its jurisdiction to include this unpleaded property.
Main Doctrine
An ordinary civil action is limited to the properties described in the pleadings and cannot expand its jurisdiction to include properties not put in issue, even if the deceased was preterited, without prejudice to the institution of separate intestate proceedings.