Aventura v. Pelayo
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: In Cadastral Case No. 88, Lot No. 2457 in Janiuay, Iloilo, both Pedro Aventura and Esperidion Adelante filed claims. Adelante failed to appear on November 8, 1951, leading to an order of default against him. Evidence for Aventura was received on April 18, 1952, and on April 24, 1952, the court adjudicated the lot to Aventura. A decree of registration was issued in Aventura's name on April 17, 1953, and Original Certificate of Title followed on May 19, 1953. Procedural History: On February 11, 1953, Roman Portaje, who had not filed a claim, filed a Petition for Review. On July 13, 1953, Esperidion Adelante reappeared and opposed Aventura's motion for a Writ of Possession. Various motions and oppositions were filed by both parties, including Adelante's motion to amend their answer and petition for review. The court, through Judge Makalintal, denied Portaje's petition on October 20, 1953, and denied a motion for reconsideration on November 18, 1953. Subsequent motions for reconsideration and review by Adelante and Portaje were also denied by Judges Makalintal and Ibañez. On February 11, 1954, Adelante filed another motion to put up a bond and lift the writ of possession, which was set for hearing by Judge Ibañez. However, due to Judge Ibañez being legislated out of office, the hearing did not proceed. Three years later, on June 15, 1957, Aventura filed a petition to terminate proceedings, which was ordered stricken off. Aventura then moved to set aside previous orders and enforce the writ of possession, which was denied by Judge Pelayo, who instead set the case for hearing. Aventura then filed a petition for certiorari to annul Judge Pelayo's order of March 18, 1958, alleging grave abuse of discretion and lack of jurisdiction due to the lapse of time. The Petition: Petitioners Pedro Aventura and Anacleta Galan filed a petition for certiorari to annul the order of respondent Judge Pantaleon A. Pelayo dated March 18, 1958, which set for hearing a motion filed by respondents Adelantes on February 11, 1954. Petitioners argued that the respondent judge acted in grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction because more than five years had elapsed from the entry of the decree of registration in their favor, rendering the decree final and indefeasible.
Issue(s)
Whether the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction in setting for hearing the respondents Adelantes' motion of February 11, 1954, considering the finality of the decree of registration in favor of the petitioners. Whether the respondents Adelantes' various motions for review and reconsideration were validly filed and had interrupted the running of the one-year period for attacking the decree of registration. Whether the respondents Adelantes were guilty of laches in the prosecution of their motions.
Ruling
The Supreme Court granted the petition for certiorari, set aside the questioned order of respondent Judge Pelayo, and ordered the final closure of Cadastral Case No. 88. The Court ruled that the respondent judge acted in grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of the respondent judge's grave abuse of discretion and excess of jurisdiction: The Court found that the respondent judge erred in setting for hearing the Adelantes' motion of February 11, 1954. This motion was a reiteration of previously denied requests to lift the writ of possession and give due course to their amended petition for review. The Court noted that the Adelantes' amended petition for review had already been denied for lack of merit by Judge Ibañez on January 19, 1954, and this denial was reiterated on February 16, 1954. Consequently, the denial had become final and indefeasible due to the lack of appeal. The Court emphasized that the period of one year within which a decree of registration may be attacked for review had long elapsed since the entry of the decree in favor of petitioners on April 17, 1953. Therefore, any hearing on the Adelantes' motion would be a superfluity as the decree had become final and incontrovertible under Section 38 of Act 496. On the validity of the respondents Adelantes' motions and interruption of the review period: The Court held that the Adelantes' amended petition for review, filed on January 8, 1954, was deemed denied in its entirety when Judge Ibañez denied their motion for reconsideration on January 19, 1954. This denial was confirmed by the subsequent order of February 16, 1954. The Court further stated that after the denial of their motion to give due course to their amended petition on February 16, 1954, the Adelantes did not take further steps to have their petition admitted. As such, their amended petition for review was never validly admitted by the Court, and it did not interrupt the running of the one-year period for review. The Court also considered that even if the amended petition was considered filed on January 8, 1954, the Adelantes failed to show that it was based on actual fraud, the sole ground for review under Section 38 of Act 496, or to explain the grounds thereof. Without such showing, it was presumed to be a reiteration of the first petition or founded on grounds available earlier, thus being a pro forma petition that did not interrupt the finality of the decree. On the issue of laches: The Court found that the respondents Adelantes were guilty of laches in the prosecution of their motion of February 13, 1954. For three years, they showed no interest in pursuing the motion until petitioners filed their petition to terminate proceedings. The Court ruled that it would be a violation of the Registration Act's purpose to render titles conclusive and indefeasible after one year, and to expedite case disposal, to still hear a motion that had been neglected for an unreasonable length of time. This inaction demonstrated an abandonment and withdrawal of their motion.
Main Doctrine
A petition for review of a decree of registration, filed beyond the one-year period from its entry, cannot be granted, especially when the subsequent motions filed by the claimant are either reiterations of previously denied petitions or lack the necessary grounds for review, such as actual fraud. Furthermore, undue delay in prosecuting motions can constitute laches, barring further consideration.