Symaco v. Aquino
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: Benito Symaco, the petitioner-appellee, sought a building permit to repair his house of strong materials located on Gen. Luna Street, Malabon, Rizal. He initially obtained a permit on May 23, 1957, for repairs. However, a building inspector noted that the old building was demolished and a new one was being constructed, contrary to the initial application and permit. 2. Procedural History: Following the inspector's report, Symaco was advised to file for a permit to construct a new building, which he did on July 29, 1957. This application underwent investigation by the District Engineer's office and was endorsed to the Municipal Mayor. Meanwhile, a civil action for forcible entry concerning a portion of the land where the building was being constructed was filed by A.M. Raymundo and Company. The Mayor, upon a letter from A.M. Raymundo and Company's counsel, withheld the issuance of the building permit, citing the pending ownership dispute. Symaco then filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the Court of First Instance of Rizal to compel the Mayor to issue the permit. The Court of First Instance ruled in favor of Symaco, ordering the Mayor to issue the permit immediately. 3. The Petition: The respondent, the Municipal Mayor, appealed the decision of the Court of First Instance. The core of the appeal hinges on whether the Mayor had the discretion to withhold the building permit. The Supreme Court is tasked with determining if the lower court erred in granting the writ of mandamus. The petitioner argues that once all requirements of the municipal ordinance were met, the issuance of the permit became a ministerial duty. The respondent contended that the pending ownership dispute and the availability of a remedy under Section 2188 of the Revised Administrative Code barred mandamus. The Supreme Court reviewed the requirements for mandamus and the nature of the Mayor's duty under the Malabon ordinance, as well as the adequacy of the alternative remedy proposed by the respondent.
Issue(s)
Whether the respondent Mayor unlawfully neglected the performance of an act specifically enjoined by law or unlawfully excluded the petitioner from the use and enjoyment of a right to which he is entitled, and if there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Whether the refusal to issue a building permit based on a pending civil case concerning a portion of the lot is a valid ground for denial.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance, ordering the issuance of the writ of mandamus to compel the respondent Mayor to issue the building permit to the petitioner immediately. The claim for damages was dismissed.
Ratio Decidendi
On the first issue: The Court reiterated the requisites for a writ of mandamus, which are: (1) that the respondent unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes the petitioner from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which he is entitled; and (2) that there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The Court found that the petitioner had complied with the requirements of Municipal Ordinance No. 20, series of 1941, for obtaining a building permit, which included stating the owner's name, location, kind of materials, and floor area. Once these requirements were met, the duty of the Municipal Mayor to issue the permit became ministerial, not discretionary. The ordinance did not grant the Mayor the discretion to refuse a permit if the applicant fulfilled the stated conditions. Therefore, the Mayor's failure to issue the permit constituted an unlawful neglect of duty. On the second issue: The Court held that the respondent Mayor's refusal to issue the building permit, premised on a pending civil action for forcible entry filed by A.M. Raymundo and Company concerning a portion of the petitioner's lot, was not a sufficient reason for denial. The Court characterized this as a purely private dispute between the petitioner and the company, which did not concern the respondent Mayor in his official capacity regarding the issuance of the permit. The Court reasoned that denying the permit based on such a collateral dispute would cause undue damage to the petitioner, who would suffer if he were allowed to build and later found not to own the land, whereas allowing him to build would not cause damages to the third-party claimant (A.M. Raymundo and Company) in case of an adverse decision, as the petitioner would be the one to suffer the consequences of removing the building. The Court also addressed the respondent's argument that Section 2188 of the Revised Administrative Code provided an alternative remedy. However, the Court found this remedy, which pertains to the supervisory authority of the provincial governor over municipal officers for disciplinary actions, to be neither plain, speedy, nor adequate for compelling the performance of a legal duty. The primary object of that provision is disciplinary, not to compel the performance of a specific ministerial act. The Court emphasized that any other remedy must be equally as convenient, complete, beneficial, and effective as mandamus to preclude its availability.
Main Doctrine
The issuance of a building permit becomes a ministerial duty of the public officer once the applicant has complied with all the requirements set forth by law or ordinance, and the refusal to issue such permit based on a collateral private dispute, such as a pending ownership case, is unlawful and may be compelled by mandamus.