Hermosisima v. Court of Appeals
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Complainant Soledad Cagigas, born in July 1917, and petitioner Francisco Hermosisima, who was almost ten years younger, had been going around together since 1950 and were regarded as engaged, though no promise of marriage was made. In 1951, Cagigas gave up teaching and became a life insurance underwriter. Intimacy developed between them, leading to sexual intercourse in 1953. In February 1954, Cagigas informed Hermosisima of her pregnancy, whereupon he promised to marry her. Their child, Chris Hermosisima, was born on June 17, 1954. However, on July 24, 1954, Hermosisima married Romanita Perez. Procedural History: On October 4, 1954, Cagigas filed a complaint seeking recognition of their child as a natural child and moral damages for alleged breach of promise. The trial court ordered Hermosisima to pay P50.00 monthly as alimony pendente lite, later reduced to P30.00. The Court of First Instance declared Chris Hermosisima as the natural daughter of the defendant, confirmed the alimony, and ordered the defendant to pay P30.00 monthly for the child's support, P4,500.00 for actual and compensatory damages, P5,000.00 for moral damages, and P500.00 for attorney's fees. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision but increased the actual and compensatory damages to P5,614.25 and moral damages to P7,000.00, holding that moral damages were recoverable due to seduction under Article 2219(3) of the Civil Code. The Petition: Petitioner Francisco Hermosisima appealed to the Supreme Court, questioning the recovery of moral damages for breach of promise to marry.
Issue(s)
Whether moral damages are recoverable for breach of promise to marry under Philippine law. Whether the award of moral damages by the Court of Appeals based on seduction is tenable.
Ruling
The Supreme Court modified the decision of the Court of Appeals. It ruled that moral damages are not recoverable for breach of promise to marry. The Court also found that the award of moral damages based on seduction was untenable. The decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed in all other respects, except for the elimination of the award for moral damages.
Ratio Decidendi
On the recoverability of moral damages for breach of promise to marry: The Court held that moral damages are not recoverable for breach of promise to marry. It noted that under the Civil Code of Spain, only reimbursement for expenses incurred due to the promised marriage was allowed, and even that was not enforced in the Philippines. The Supreme Court's ruling in De Jesus vs. Syquia (58 Phil., 866) established that the action for breach of promise to marry has no standing in civil law, apart from recovering money or property advanced on the faith of such promise. Although the Code Commission proposed provisions for moral damages in cases of breach of promise to marry, these were eliminated by Congress. The Court cited the report of the Senate Committee, which expressed concern that such actions could be easily abused and that creating such causes of action would be a step in the wrong direction, echoing the trend in many American states to abolish similar suits. Therefore, the award of moral damages made by the lower courts was deemed untenable. On the award of moral damages based on seduction: The Court found the Court of Appeals' basis for awarding moral damages due to seduction to be untenable. The appellate court cited Article 2219(3) of the new Civil Code. However, the Supreme Court reasoned that the tenor of Article 2219, particularly the surrounding paragraphs and the language used, strongly indicates that the 'seduction' contemplated therein refers to the crime punished under Articles 337 and 338 of the Revised Penal Code, which was not established in this case. Furthermore, the Court found that the petitioner was not morally guilty of seduction. It pointed out that the complainant was approximately ten years younger than the petitioner, was around thirty-six years old, and was an enlightened individual (former high school teacher and life insurance agent) when she became intimate with the petitioner, who was then a mere apprentice pilot. The Court also noted the trial court's finding that the complainant "surrendered herself" because, "overwhelmed by her love" for the petitioner, she "wanted to bind" them by having a child even before marriage.
Main Doctrine
Moral damages are not recoverable for breach of promise to marry under Philippine law, as the action for breach of promise to marry has no standing in the civil law apart from the right to recover money or property advanced upon the faith of such promise, and legislative attempts to create such causes of action have been eliminated by Congress.