Cruz v. Torres
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Plaintiff Rosalinda Z. Tiongco filed a complaint alleging ownership and possession of Lot No. 1856 of the Sta. Rosa Cadastre. She claimed that the defendant, Marta de la Cruz, accompanied by armed men, entered the lot, destroyed her barbed wire fences and her tenant's house, and threatened to return to harvest the palay by force and intimidation. The plaintiff further alleged that the defendant threatened to enter the land again on October 22, 1958, with armed men to harvest the palay through force. Procedural History: The plaintiff prayed for a writ of preliminary injunction to prohibit the defendant and her agents from entering the land and molesting her possession, and for the injunction to be made permanent after trial, along with damages and attorney's fees. The lower court, on November 5, 1958, issued a writ of preliminary injunction. The defendant sought to file a counter-bond to preserve her possession and the palay, to which the court responded that she should file a corresponding petition if she wished to lift the writ. The Petition: The defendant filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus, contending that the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction was improper because (a) an injunction, as a provisional remedy, cannot stand alone; (b) the allegations in the complaint were insufficient; (c) she was not served a copy of the plaintiff's bond; and (d) the lower court should have considered her readiness to file a counter-bond.
Issue(s)
Whether the allegations in the complaint were sufficient to warrant the issuance of a preliminary injunction. Whether the issuance of the preliminary injunction was improper due to the defendant not being served a copy of the plaintiff's bond. Whether the lower court erred in not considering the defendant's readiness to file a counter-bond to quash the writ.
Ruling
The petition is dismissed. The Supreme Court found no merit in the petitioner's contentions and affirmed the propriety of the lower court's order issuing the writ of preliminary injunction.
Ratio Decidendi
On the sufficiency of allegations and the nature of injunction: The Court clarified that while a preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy that must be ancillary to a principal case, an action for injunction where the sole relief sought is to restrain the commission or continuance of the act complained of is permissible. The plaintiff alleged ownership and peaceful possession, coupled with threats of dispossession and destruction that would result in irreparable damage, which are sufficient bases for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. The Court held that, in the absence of a contrary showing, the lower court did not abuse its discretion in issuing the writ based on these allegations. On the service of the plaintiff's bond: The Court considered the assertion that the defendant was not served a copy of the plaintiff's bond as a mere formal defect that does not adversely affect the writ already issued. Such a defect, if it exists, can be cured by subsequent notice or knowledge of the defendant. Furthermore, the defendant's act of seeking to file a counter-bond can be considered a waiver of this formal defect. The defendant could have requested the court to order the plaintiff to serve a copy of the bond if no notice had yet been given. On the effect of offering a counter-bond: The Court found the petitioner's conclusion that the mere offer to file a counter-bond is sufficient to quash the writ to be erroneous. The issuance of the writ was based on the merits of the case and the court's discretion, not solely on the parties' manifestation regarding a counter-bond. The court's order explicitly stated that the defendant should file a petition if she wished to lift the writ. The Court emphasized that the writ may be granted or dissolved only upon good and valid grounds, which are determined by the sound discretion of the court. The mere offer of a counter-bond does not suffice to warrant dissolution, especially when there is a threatened destruction of property, which cannot be countenanced even if the party is willing to pay for damages.
Main Doctrine
The issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is a matter within the sound discretion of the court, and such discretion cannot be controlled by the mere offer to file a counter-bond without sufficient grounds for dissolution.