Quitiquit v. Villacorta
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: Mariano Quitiquit served in various temporary capacities within the Bureau of Public Works and Dagupan City from January 1, 1939, to July 31, 1956. On August 1, 1956, he received a promotional appointment as a right-of-way agent, authorized under Section 682 of the Revised Administrative Code, with the condition that it would continue until replaced by an eligible but not beyond thirty days from receipt of certifications of eligibles. His proposed promotion to a higher salary was denied due to his non-eligible status. Subsequently, his temporary appointment was extended from February 2, 1958, to May 2, 1958. 2. Procedural History: Following the expiration of his extended temporary appointment on May 2, 1958, Mariano Quitiquit was informed that his services would no longer be needed. He contested this, asserting his employment was guaranteed by Civil Service Rules and Regulations and that he could not be separated without cause. As he was not allowed to continue working, Quitiquit filed a petition for mandamus against the City Engineer of Dagupan City, seeking to be reinstated to his office, which he claimed was unjustly taken from him. The respondent City Engineer argued that Quitiquit's appointment was temporary and terminable at pleasure, and that Quitiquit was estopped from claiming permanency due to his acceptance of a temporary role. The trial court dismissed the petition for lack of merit, leading to the present appeal. 3. The Petition: This case comes before the Supreme Court on appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, which dismissed appellant Mariano Quitiquit's petition for mandamus. Quitiquit contends that under Republic Act No. 186, he is a civil service eligible with permanent status and was unlawfully removed from his position. The appellee, the City Engineer of Dagupan City, maintains that Quitiquit's appointment was temporary, made pursuant to Section 682 of the Revised Administrative Code, and thus could be terminated at the pleasure of the appointing power. The appellee also argues that Quitiquit is estopped from asserting a right to permanency and that he had adequate administrative remedies available. The appeal seeks to overturn the trial court's dismissal of the mandamus petition.
Issue(s)
Whether the appellant, despite possessing civil service eligibility by virtue of Republic Act No. 186, acquired permanent status and security of tenure in his position. Whether a temporary appointment, even if extended, can be terminated at the pleasure of the appointing power without violating the security of tenure of the employee.
Ruling
The decision of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan dismissing the petition for mandamus is affirmed. The appellant's services were validly terminated as his appointment was temporary in character.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of permanent status and security of tenure for temporary appointees: The Court held that the nature of the appointment, not the item filled, determines its character. Appellant's appointment was explicitly temporary under Section 682 of the Revised Administrative Code. A temporary appointment is akin to an acting appointment, characterized by its temporary nature and its terminability at the pleasure of the appointing power. Therefore, one holding a temporary appointment cannot claim the security of tenure guaranteed by the Constitution to permanent employees. Even if the appellant had become a civil service eligible by virtue of Republic Act No. 186 due to his long service, this eligibility did not automatically convert his temporary appointment into a permanent one, nor did it grant him protection under the security of tenure provisions. The Court reiterated that the essence of a temporary appointment lies in its terminability at pleasure, and the holder cannot complain if it is terminated at a moment's notice. The Court cited previous rulings in Villanosa, et al. vs. Alera, et al., Cuadra vs. Cordova, and Reyes, et al. vs. Dones, et al. to support this principle, emphasizing that the nature of the appointment itself is the determining factor, not the length of service or the eligibility acquired during such service. On the termination of temporary appointments: The Court affirmed that a temporary appointment can be terminated at the pleasure of the appointing power. The appellant's acceptance of a temporary appointment, knowing its limited duration and terminable nature, meant he acquiesced to its conditions. The Court referenced cases like Roque, et al. vs. President of the Senate, etc. and Tolentino, et al. vs. Torres, etc., where it was held that employees who repeatedly accepted temporary employment or held temporary appointments were barred from questioning their dismissal or lay-off. Therefore, the termination of appellant's services, effective May 2, 1958, was a valid exercise of the appointing power's prerogative concerning temporary appointments.
Main Doctrine
A temporary appointment, characterized by its terminability at the pleasure of the appointing power, does not grant the holder security of tenure, even if they possess civil service eligibility, if the appointment itself is explicitly temporary.