Amar v. Odiaman
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Plaintiff-appellant Teodora Amar filed an action on November 24, 1958, against defendant-appellee Jesus Odiaman in the Court of First Instance of Capiz. The action sought to recover a piece of land allegedly seized by the defendant and others in April 1948 through deceit, fraud, and false pretenses. The plaintiff also claimed damages for the land's products and attorney's fees. Procedural History: The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the cause of action, which accrued in April 1948, was barred by the 10-year statute of limitations under Act No. 190. The trial court granted the motion, dismissing the complaint. The plaintiff moved for reconsideration, which was denied. Subsequently, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint, alleging prior cases filed against the defendant concerning the same land: a forcible entry case filed on September 8, 1948, which was dismissed on appeal on July 17, 1951, upon plaintiff's motion; and an ownership and damages case filed on May 29, 1952, which was dismissed without prejudice on September 13, 1957. The trial court treated this as a second motion for reconsideration and denied it. The plaintiff appealed. The Petition: The plaintiff-appellant argued that the filing of the two prior cases interrupted the running of the prescriptive period.
Issue(s)
Whether the filing of the two prior cases (forcible entry and ownership/damages) interrupted the running of the 10-year prescriptive period for the recovery of real property under Act No. 190. Whether the plaintiff's action to recover the land was barred by the statute of limitations.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the order of dismissal, holding that the plaintiff's action was barred by the statute of limitations.
Ratio Decidendi
On the interruption of the prescriptive period: The Court held that under Act No. 190, the filing of an action, even a judicial one, does not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period for the recovery of real property if the action is dismissed or withdrawn. The Court cited its previous rulings in Oriental Commercial Co., Inc. vs. Jureidini, Inc., et al. and Conspecto vs. Fruto, stating that the parties are left in the same position as if no action had been commenced at all. The Court also clarified that Articles 1943, 1945, and 1946 of the old Civil Code, cited by the appellant, pertain to acquisitive prescription and interruption of possession, not extinctive prescription of actions. The applicable provision for interruption of extinctive prescription under the old Civil Code, Article 1973, was repealed by Section 50 of Act No. 190, as held in Pelaez vs. Abreu. Therefore, the filing of the forcible entry case and the ownership case did not interrupt the 10-year prescriptive period. On the applicability of Act No. 190 and the statute of limitations: The Court reiterated that the cause of action accrued in April 1948. Since this was before the effectivity of the new Civil Code (August 30, 1950), Act No. 190, which was in force at the time the cause of action accrued, governed the prescription. Section 40 of Act No. 190 provides that an action for recovery of title to, or possession of, real property must be brought within ten years after the cause of action accrues. The Court further relied on its interpretation in Peralta et al. vs. Alipio, which stated that Act No. 190 contains no specific provision for the suspension or interruption of the prescriptive period by the institution of an action. Consequently, the 10-year period from April 1948 expired in April 1958. The present action was filed in November 1958, which was seven months after the prescriptive period had elapsed. Thus, the action was undeniably barred by the statute of limitations, and the lower court correctly dismissed it.
Main Doctrine
Under Act No. 190, the filing of an action, if dismissed or withdrawn, does not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period for the recovery of real property. The parties are left in the same position as if no action had been commenced.