Marcelo v. Mencias
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: The underlying dispute concerns the ownership and possession of three parcels of land in Taguig, Rizal. Petitioner Rafael Marcelo applied for the registration of these lots. His application was opposed by Leocadio Pagsisihan, the predecessor-in-interest of respondent Clemente Pagsisihan, who claimed ownership. Procedural History: The Court of First Instance of Rizal, acting as a land registration court, initially declared petitioner Marcelo the owner of only one lot, deeming the other two public lands. However, the Court of Appeals reversed this decision, affirming Marcelo's ownership of all three lots. After the appellate court's judgment became final, a certificate of title was issued to Marcelo. When respondent Clemente Pagsisihan refused to deliver possession of the two lots he occupied, Marcelo filed a petition for a writ of possession, which was granted. Subsequently, Pagsisihan refused to vacate and remove his house from the property. Marcelo then filed a petition for demolition, which the respondent Judge denied, ruling that the land registration court lacked jurisdiction to order demolition. The Petition: Petitioner Rafael Marcelo seeks a writ of certiorari and mandamus to set aside the orders of the respondent Judge denying his petition for demolition. He argues that the Court of First Instance, sitting as a land registration court, has the authority to order demolition as a necessary ancillary remedy to enforce a writ of possession. Marcelo contends that Section 13 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which allows for special orders of demolition after due hearing, is applicable to land registration cases in a suppletory character, and that the court possesses inherent power to issue such writs to administer justice and prevent multiplicity of suits.
Issue(s)
Whether a Court of First Instance, sitting as a land registration court, has the jurisdiction or authority to order the demolition of improvements as an incident to a writ of possession.
Ruling
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioner, setting aside the orders of the respondent Judge and remanding the case for further proceedings on the petition for demolition. The Court held that the land registration court has the jurisdiction to issue a writ of demolition.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Supreme Court held that the Rules of Court apply to land registration cases in a suppletory character pursuant to Rule 132. While the respondent judge believed Section 13, Rule 39 was limited to ordinary civil actions, the Court clarified that if a writ of possession implies the delivery of land to a successful litigant in a registration case, a writ of demolition must likewise issue as its complement. Applying the ruling in Demorar v. Ibañez, the Court emphasized that a writ of demolition is necessary because, without it, the writ of possession would be ineffective against an occupant who refuses to remove structures. Furthermore, under Section 6, Rule 124, when jurisdiction is conferred on a court, all auxiliary writs and processes necessary to carry it into effect are also granted to that court. The Court noted that requiring a successful litigant to file a separate civil action for ejectment would be a 'cumbersome process' that 'fosters unnecessary and expensive litigations' and results in a multiplicity of suits, which the judicial system abhors. Finally, citing Shioji v. Harvey, the Court asserted that every court has the inherent power to do all things reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within the scope of its jurisdiction, including the removal of obstructions to the delivery of possession.
Main Doctrine
A land registration court, having jurisdiction to issue a writ of possession, possesses the inherent power and authority to issue a writ of demolition as an auxiliary process to render the writ of possession effective, even if the Land Registration Law is silent on the matter, by applying the Rules of Court suppletorily.