Tolentino v. Inciong
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Miguel Tolentino filed an action for damages against Ceferino Inciong for libel, for which Inciong had been found guilty in a criminal case. The libelous matter was published and circulated in a newspaper owned by Inciong on July 24, Procedural History: On December 20, 1952, Miguel Tolentino filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Batangas to recover damages for libel committed by defendant Ceferino Inciong. The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint, alleging lack of cause of action, bar by prior judgment, and improper venue. The motion was denied. The case was dismissed without prejudice due to the plaintiff's and counsel's failure to appear, but was later reinstated. The defendant amended his answer, including prescription as an affirmative defense and a counterclaim for damages. The plaintiff initially opposed the amendment, but later withdrew the opposition after the defendant reduced his counterclaim. The defendant filed another motion to dismiss, this time styled as a demurrer to evidence, on grounds of bar by prior judgment, prescription, and non-suit. This motion was also denied. After the defendant presented his evidence, the trial court rendered a decision dismissing the plaintiff's complaint on the ground of prescription. The Appeal: The plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals. Opining that the decisive question of whether or not plaintiff's cause of action has already prescribed is one of law and that plaintiff's claim for damages, including attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, amounts to P99,500 which is beyond its competent jurisdiction, the appellate court certified the case to the Supreme Court.
Issue(s)
Whether the plaintiff's cause of action for damages arising from libel has prescribed. Whether the defense of prescription was waived by the defendant.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court, dismissing the plaintiff's complaint on the ground of prescription. The Court held that the action was filed beyond the prescriptive periods provided by law.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of prescription: The Court held that the plaintiff's cause of action for damages arising from libel had prescribed. Under the law prevailing prior to the new Civil Code, an action for libel must be brought within two years after the right of action accrues (Sec. 43[2], Act No. 190). Under the new Civil Code, the prescriptive period is one year (Tejuco vs. E.R. Squibb and Son Phil., Corp., et al., 103 Phil., 594; Inciong, et al. vs. Tolentino, 106 Phil., 207). The period is counted from the day the action could have been brought, which for libel is upon its publication or circulation. In this case, the libelous matter was published on July 24, 1949, and the action was filed on December 24, 1952. This period of three years and five months exceeded both the two-year period under Act No. 190 and the one-year period under the new Civil Code. Even if the prescriptive period were computed from the effectivity of the new Civil Code on August 30, 1950, the action would still be barred as it was filed more than one year thereafter. On the issue of waiver of defense: The Court ruled that the defendant did not waive the defense of prescription. While the defense was not initially included in the first motion to dismiss, it was subsequently raised as an affirmative defense in the amended answer, which was admitted by the trial court after the plaintiff withdrew his opposition. The Court noted that the trial court has wide discretion in allowing amendments to pleadings in furtherance of justice. Furthermore, the defense of prescription in this case did not involve an issue of fact not appearing on the face of the pleading, as the dates necessary for computation were alleged in the complaint itself. Therefore, the failure to plead it in the first motion to dismiss did not constitute a waiver (Chua Lamko vs. Dioso, 97 Phil., 821).
Main Doctrine
An action for libel prescribes within two years under Act No. 190, and within one year under the new Civil Code. The prescriptive period is counted from the date the cause of action accrues, which for libel is upon publication or circulation. The filing of a criminal action does not suspend the prescriptive period for a separate civil action for damages arising from libel, as the latter may proceed independently.