Marquez v. Panganiban
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: Petitioners Aurelio Cerrodo and Julia Vinas were instituted as tenants by respondent Nena Marquez on a 4-hectare coconut landholding in November 1955, with respondent Vicente Noza acting as overseer. The agreed crop sharing was 60-40 in favor of the landholder. Petitioners allege that 7% of their share was deducted for the overseer's services, and that from November 1956 to July 1957, Noza withheld half of their share. In August 1957, after demanding the return of the withheld shares and the 7% deduction, Cerrodo and Vinas were ejected from the land. Subsequently, a criminal case for qualified theft was filed against Aurelio Cerrodo, and their house on the landholding was burned. 2. Procedural History: On September 30, 1957, Cerrodo and Vinas filed a case in the Court of Agrarian Relations seeking delivery of shares, reinstatement, and damages. A decision was rendered on May 4, 1959, in favor of the tenants, ordering the petitioners (Marquez and Noza) to pay sums of money and reinstate them. Notice of this decision was served on petitioners' counsel on May 12, 1959. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on June 3, 1959, which was denied on July 3, 1959, for being filed out of the reglementary period. A second motion for reconsideration was filed on July 17, 1959, alleging late receipt of the decision, which was also denied on July 28, 1959. The tenants then moved for execution of the judgment. 3. The Petition: Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with a prayer for a preliminary injunction with the Supreme Court on August 26, 1959. They claim the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying their motions for reconsideration and in granting the tenants' motion for execution. The petitioners argue that their counsel did not receive the decision promptly due to an improper service and that their second motion for reconsideration should have been considered. The Supreme Court found that the counsel failed to notify the court of his change of address and that service was reasonably effected under the circumstances. Furthermore, the Court noted that the grounds raised in the second motion for reconsideration existed at the time of the first motion, rendering the second motion untimely and not serving to suspend the period for appeal.
Issue(s)
Whether the respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying the first motion for reconsideration on the ground that it was filed out of time. Whether the service of notice and copy of the CAR decision on petitioners' counsel was valid, considering his alleged change of address and the manner of service. Whether the second motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners' counsel suspended the running of the period to appeal.
Ruling
The petition is denied and dismissed. The preliminary injunction is dissolved. Costs are against the petitioners.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Supreme Court held that the respondent Judge did not act with grave abuse of discretion in denying the first motion for reconsideration. Petitioners' counsel, Atty. Eduardo V. Guevarra, admitted to residing in Manila since November 1958, six months before the decision in question was rendered. However, he failed to notify the Court of Agrarian Relations (CAR) or opposing counsel of this change of address. An attorney has a fundamental duty to himself and his clients to maintain a system ensuring prompt receipt of all judicial notices, as previously held in Enriquez, et al., vs. Bautista, et al. (79 Phil. 220) and Martinez, et al., vs. Martinez, et al. (90 Phil. 697). The Court emphasized that counsel's failure to notify the court of his new address and to ensure prompt receipt of judicial processes constituted plain dereliction of duty. Therefore, the denial of the motion, which was indeed filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period based on the valid service, was proper and not an abuse of discretion. On Issue 2: The Supreme Court affirmed the validity of the service of notice and copy of the decision. Despite Atty. Guevarra's claim of not being connected with Atty. Alfredo Raya's office, the records showed several instances indicating an association. Counsel for petitioners had used an envelope with Raya's law office letterhead in correspondence, appeared as co-counsel with Raya in Civil Case No. 6039 of the Court of First Instance of Lucena (Argosimo, et al. vs. Chionglo), and his name appeared on a signboard at Raya's law office. These facts led to the reasonable conclusion that Raya and Guevarra were partners or at least shared a common law office, justifying the Chief of Police in serving the notice there. Furthermore, Felicitas Pabellano, a clerk of Atty. Raya and a person of sufficient discretion, received the notice and copy of the decision 'for and in behalf' of Atty. Guevarra. Given Atty. Guevarra's absence from Lucena and his failure to provide notice of his change of address, the method of service was deemed appropriate and effective. On Issue 3: The Supreme Court ruled that the second motion for reconsideration did not suspend the running of the period to appeal. The established rule, as per Section 1, Rule 17 of the Rules of the CAR, dictates that a second motion for reconsideration based on grounds already existing at the time the first motion was filed does not interrupt the period for appeal. Petitioners' counsel raised the issue of improper service and the actual date of receipt (May 29, 1959) only in his second motion for reconsideration filed on July 17, 1959. This ground, pertaining to the validity of service, clearly existed when the first motion for reconsideration was filed on June 3, 1959. Consequently, the denial of the first motion on July 3, 1959, was final for purposes of calculating the appeal period. Petitioners had 10 days from July 3, 1959 (the date of denial), until July 13, 1959, to perfect an appeal. The second motion, filed on July 17, 1959, was therefore filed four days late. Thus, the lower court correctly denied the second motion for reconsideration as having been filed out of time.
Main Doctrine
A second motion for reconsideration based on a ground already existing at the time of the first motion does not suspend the running of the period to appeal. Failure of counsel to notify the court of a change in address and to adopt a system for prompt receipt of notices constitutes dereliction of duty.