Unson v. Lacson
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Cipriano E. Unson filed a complaint seeking to annul Ordinance No. 3470 of the City of Manila and a lease contract granted to Genato Commercial Corporation. The ordinance withdrew a portion of Callejon del Carmen from public use and converted it into patrimonial property for lease. Unson, as owner of an abutting lot and building, objected because the construction by Genato Commercial blocked the exit from his building, prejudicing students of the Mapa High School and depriving the public of the use of the Callejon. Procedural History: The Court of First Instance of Manila ruled against Unson. On appeal, the Supreme Court, in G.R. No. L-7909, promulgated on January 8, 1957, declared Ordinance No. 3470 and the lease contract null and void, finding them inconsistent with Article 638 of the Civil Code, as the construction rendered impossible the public use of the three-meter zone along the Northern margin of the Estero de San Sebastian. The Petition: After the decision became final, Unson sought a writ of execution directing Genato Commercial Corporation to remove any construction made on the leased land. Genato Commercial objected, arguing the decision did not explicitly order demolition. The trial court granted the writ of execution, leading to the present appeal by Genato Commercial.
Issue(s)
Whether the writ of execution can include the demolition of the construction made by Genato Commercial Corporation despite the absence of an explicit order for demolition in the original decision. Whether Genato Commercial Corporation can claim rights as a builder in good faith under Articles 448, 546, and 548 of the Civil Code.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the trial court issuing the writ of execution, including the demolition of the construction made by Genato Commercial Corporation. The Court held that a judgment is not confined to what appears on its face but includes those necessarily included or necessary thereto.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of whether the writ of execution can include demolition: The Supreme Court held that the judgment in G.R. No. L-7909, which declared Ordinance No. 3470 and the lease contract null and void, necessarily included the removal of the construction. The Court reasoned that the very purpose of annulling the ordinance and the lease was to restore the Callejon to its public use, which was obstructed by Genato's building. To allow the building to remain would render the annulment judgment ineffective. The Court cited its ruling in Perez v. Evite (L-16003, March 29, 1961) and Marcelo v. Mencias (G.R. No. L-5609, April 29, 1960), stating that a successful litigant is entitled to an order of demolition of structures erected on the land in dispute. The Court emphasized that requiring Unson to file another action for demolition would be a cumbersome process and contrary to the principle of complete and effective execution of judgments. The Court noted that Genato Commercial had not raised any defense regarding its right to keep the building if the ordinance was found invalid, nor had it reserved any privilege to claim as a builder in good faith during the original proceedings. On the issue of claiming rights as a builder in good faith: The Supreme Court found that Articles 448, 546, and 548 of the New Civil Code were not applicable to Genato Commercial Corporation's claim. Article 448 pertains to the "owner of land on which anything has been built," and in this case, Unson was not the owner of the Callejon, nor had the City of Manila, the owner, appealed. Articles 546 and 548 would be applicable if Unson had been awarded possession of the Callejon, which he was not. The Court reiterated that the primary issue was the validity of the ordinance and the lease, and Genato Commercial's construction was made under the assumption of a valid lease, which was later declared void. Therefore, the corporation could not invoke the rights of a builder in good faith.
Main Doctrine
A writ of execution may include the demolition of a structure if it is a necessary consequence of the annulment of an ordinance and a lease contract, even if not explicitly stated in the dispositive portion, to give full effect to the judgment.