Reyes v. Romero
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: A raid on a house in Pasay City, identified as a gambling casino, led to charges against twelve individuals for Violation of the Gambling Law (Crim. Case 8212), who were subsequently acquitted due to insufficient evidence. In a separate offshoot of the same raid, herein petitioners Aurelio P. Reyes and Francisco Reyes were charged with being maintainers of a gambling den under Article 195, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code (Crim. Case No. 8370) before the Municipal Court of Pasay City. Procedural History: The trial for Crim. Case No. 8370 commenced before Judge Lucio Tianco. However, due to Judge Tianco's leave, respondent Judge Guillermo Romero was designated as acting judge. Judge Romero continued with the hearing. Upon Judge Tianco's return, he resumed his duties. Despite this, Judge Romero ordered the continuation of the trial before him. Petitioners filed a motion to inhibit Judge Romero, which was denied. A motion for reconsideration was also denied. The continuation of the hearing by Judge Romero was authorized by the Secretary of Justice through Administrative Order No. 183, which stipulated that Judge Romero would preside over the case whenever Judge Tianco went on leave. The Petition: Petitioners filed a petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction before the Supreme Court, assailing the legality of Administrative Order No. 183. They argued that the order was contrary to the Charter of Pasay City (Republic Act No. 183), that allowing Judge Romero to continue would violate the independence of the judiciary, and that they had no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy.
Issue(s)
Whether Administrative Order No. 183, designating respondent Judge Guillermo Romero as acting Municipal Judge of Pasay City to continue hearing Criminal Case No. 8370, is valid and proper. Whether respondent Judge Guillermo Romero acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in refusing to inhibit himself from continuing the trial of Criminal Case No. 8370.
Ruling
The petition is denied, and the writ of preliminary injunction earlier issued is dissolved.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Supreme Court held that Administrative Order No. 183 was valid and proper. The Court noted that the order was issued after Judge Tianco had returned to work and, significantly, at his own request. Judge Tianco had written to the Secretary of Justice requesting a leave of absence on December 17, 1958, specifically to enable Judge Romero to continue the trial of Criminal Case No. 8370, which he had already started. Judge Tianco further requested to be considered on leave every time Judge Romero had to try the case until its final termination. The Court found that Judge Tianco's motivation was to have the case terminated by the judge who had already commenced it, for the convenience and fairness to all parties, and in the interest of justice. The Judiciary Act of 1948 and the Charter of Pasay City authorize the designation of a temporary judge in the municipal court if the exigencies of the service demand it, with such designation to be taken from the nearest place. Section 76 of the Pasay City Charter specifically permits the designation of an acting judge in case of absence of the municipal judge. On Issue 2: The Supreme Court ruled that respondent Judge Guillermo Romero did not act without or in excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. The Court pointed out that the petition for prohibition lacked any allegation charging the respondent Judge with lack of jurisdiction or commission of grave abuse of discretion. Even if such allegations were present, the Court found no abuse of discretion, much less a grave one, because the respondent Judge was merely complying with a valid and legal administrative order issued by the Secretary of Justice. The act of continuing the hearing was pursuant to Administrative Order No. 183, which the Court found to be lawful. Therefore, his refusal to inhibit himself, based on the premise that he was acting under a valid directive, was not an abuse of discretion.
Main Doctrine
The Supreme Court affirmed the authority of the Secretary of Justice to issue administrative orders designating acting judges to continue hearing cases already commenced, particularly when such designation is requested by the incumbent judge and is deemed to be in the interest of justice. The Court held that a judge acting in accordance with a valid administrative order does not commit grave abuse of discretion, and that a petition for prohibition is not the proper remedy when the alleged error is an error of judgment within the judge's jurisdiction.