Dauz v. Eleosida
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Gervacio Dauz, a general merchant, was prosecuted before the justice of the peace of Kidapawan, Cotabato, for allegedly failing to pay the second, third, and fourth quarter license fees for the year 1958, as required by local Ordinance No. 21, series of 1956. Dauz had paid the first quarter fees for the same year. Procedural History: Dauz filed a motion to quash the information, arguing that the facts charged did not constitute a criminal offense and that the government's remedy should have been a civil action to collect the unpaid fees plus surcharges. The justice of the peace denied the motion. Subsequently, Dauz filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in the Court of First Instance. The Petition: The Court of First Instance dismissed Dauz's petition, stating that his proper remedy was to appeal after a conviction on the merits. Dauz appealed this dismissal directly to the Supreme Court, contending that the lower court erred in dismissing his petition for certiorari and prohibition.
Issue(s)
Whether the Court of First Instance erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by the petitioner. Whether the prosecution of the petitioner for non-payment of ordinance fees, despite having paid the first quarter, was the proper remedy, or if a civil action was warranted.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance dismissing the petition for certiorari and prohibition. The Court held that the petitioner's remedy was to proceed with the trial on the merits in the justice of the peace court and, if convicted, to appeal the decision.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Supreme Court held that the Court of First Instance correctly dismissed the petition for certiorari and prohibition. The Court reiterated the well-established principle that certiorari and prohibition are extraordinary remedies that are only available when there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In this case, the petitioner had a clear and adequate remedy through an appeal after a trial on the merits in the justice of the peace court. The dismissal of the petition was therefore proper as these writs cannot be used as substitutes for appeal. On Issue 2: The Court found that the petitioner's argument regarding the proper remedy for the collection of unpaid ordinance fees was a matter that should be addressed during the trial on the merits. Whether the payment of the first quarter fees constituted a defense against the criminal prosecution for non-payment of subsequent quarters was an issue to be determined by the justice of the peace court. If the petitioner was convicted, he could then raise this defense and any other errors through an appeal to the Court of First Instance. Therefore, the lower court correctly ruled that the petitioner should exhaust the available remedies in the regular course of judicial proceedings before resorting to extraordinary writs.
Main Doctrine
The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of a petition for certiorari and prohibition, holding that these extraordinary remedies are not available when a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, such as an appeal, exists. The Court reasoned that the petitioner's contention regarding the proper remedy for the collection of unpaid ordinance fees was a matter that should be raised and proven during the trial on the merits, and if convicted, the petitioner could then avail of an appeal.