Vito v. Lacson
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: Pascuala R. Vito, a civil service eligible, held various government positions, including classroom teacher and property custodian in the Office of the Mayor of Manila. Upon Mayor Arsenio H. Lacson's assumption of office, Vito was transferred. Subsequently, Vito filed administrative charges against Mayor Lacson. Following an incident involving breach of peace and alleged damage to government property, Mayor Lacson dismissed Vito from service on June 11, 1954. Vito was also criminally charged for breach of peace, a charge later dismissed for insufficient evidence. 2. Procedural History: Vito appealed her dismissal to Executive Secretary Mariano Yengco, Jr., who modified the decision, imposing a two-month suspension without pay and ordering Vito's reinstatement. Mayor Lacson filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. He then filed a second motion for reconsideration, leading Executive Secretary Fortunato de Leon to issue a resolution on February 8, 1956, reversing the prior decision and ordering Vito's dismissal. Vito's subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied on March 26, 1957. Vito then filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Supreme Court, which was dismissed without prejudice to refiling in the Court of First Instance. She then initiated the present action in the Court of First Instance of Manila on March 25, 1958. 3. The Petition: The Court of First Instance dismissed Vito's petition, ruling that the Mayor was not bound by the appeal rules to the Executive Secretary and that the latter acted within his authority. Vito appealed this dismissal directly to the Supreme Court. The core issue is whether the rules governing appeals and motions for reconsideration, specifically the 5-day period for filing a motion for reconsideration of an Executive Secretary's decision, apply to the Mayor. Vito argues that Mayor Lacson's motion for reconsideration was filed 37 days after the initial decision, rendering it untimely and the subsequent dismissal resolution invalid. The Supreme Court is asked to determine the applicability and timeliness of the procedural rules in this administrative appeal context.
Issue(s)
Whether the 5-day period for filing a motion for reconsideration of a decision rendered by the Executive Secretary applies to the Mayor of Manila. Whether the Executive Secretary can reverse a prior decision 'motu proprio' after the reglementary period for reconsideration has expired.
Ruling
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of First Instance. It set aside the resolution issued by Executive Secretary Fortunato de Leon on February 8, 1956, and his confirmatory resolution dated March 26, 1957. No pronouncement as to costs was made.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Court ruled that the rules governing motions for reconsideration apply to the Mayor of Manila. While the rules regarding the initial appeal from the Mayor's decision specifically mention the 'respondent-appellant' (because a Mayor cannot appeal his own decision), the rule regarding the reconsideration of the Secretary's decision refers more broadly to the 'appellant' or any party adversely affected. The Court reasoned that a decision of the Executive Secretary could be adverse to the Mayor, and in such instances, the Mayor is the party prejudiced who must seek relief. Adopting a different interpretation would be discriminatory and a violation of the equal protection of the laws. Therefore, because Mayor Lacson received the decision on May 23 and only filed his motion on June 29, the 37-day delay was fatal to his petition. On Issue 2: The Court held that the Executive Secretary's power to modify or reverse decisions is not absolute in terms of timing. While the Executive Secretary may alter or reverse his own decision 'motu proprio' by virtue of the President's constitutional control of executive departments, this can only be done before the decision becomes final and executory. Rule 7(c) of the applicable regulations provides that upon the expiration of the 5-day period without a petition for reconsideration being filed, the decision becomes final. Since the 5-day period had long expired before Mayor Lacson's late filing, Secretary Yengco's decision had already attained finality. Consequently, Secretary De Leon had no valid authority to issue a resolution reversing it, as it would contravene the rules adopted by the Department of the Interior.
Main Doctrine
A motion for reconsideration filed beyond the reglementary period, as prescribed by the applicable rules and regulations, renders the decision final and executory, precluding any valid action thereon by the reviewing official.