Geluz v. Lazo

G.R. No. L-16439 · 1961-07-20 · J. REYES, J.B.L., J.: · Primary: Civil; Secondary: Ethics
REITERATION

Facts

The Antecedents: Nita Villanueva, advised by her aunt, underwent an abortion by physician Antonio Geluz in 1950 to conceal her pregnancy from her parents. After marrying Oscar Lazo, she became pregnant again and, due to employment inconvenience, had a second abortion performed by Geluz in October 1953. Less than two years later, she became pregnant for a third time. On February 21, 1955, accompanied by her sister and niece, she again underwent an abortion of a two-month-old fetus at Geluz's clinic for P50.00. At the time of the third abortion, the husband, Oscar Lazo, was in Cagayan campaigning for his election and was unaware of, nor did he consent to, the abortion. Procedural History: Oscar Lazo filed a complaint against Antonio Geluz for damages. The Court of First Instance of Manila rendered judgment in favor of Lazo, ordering Geluz to pay P3,000.00 as damages, P700.00 for attorney's fees, and costs. On appeal, the Court of Appeals sustained the award by a majority vote. The Petition: The case reached the Supreme Court via a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals.

Issue(s)

Whether the husband of a woman who voluntarily procured her abortion could recover damages from the physician who caused the same. Whether an unborn foetus is endowed with personality for purposes of damages under Article 2206 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Whether moral damages and exemplary damages are warranted under the circumstances of the case.

Ruling

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and ordered the dismissal of the complaint. It held that the husband could not recover damages for the abortion of his wife because an unborn fetus lacks juridical personality and cannot be the subject of an action for damages. The Court also found no basis for moral damages due to the husband's apparent indifference to previous abortions and his mercenary pursuit of the claim.

Ratio Decidendi

On Issue 1: The Supreme Court held that while the act of provoking an abortion without medical necessity is a criminal and morally reprehensible act that cannot be too severely condemned, the immorality or illegality of the act does not automatically justify an award of damages that lacks a factual or legal basis. The Court clarified that an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the one injured. Therefore, if no action for such damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child on account of the injuries it received, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs. The prevailing American jurisprudence was cited to the same effect, generally holding that recovery cannot be had for the death of an unborn child. The consent of the woman or her husband does not excuse such acts, but liability for damages still requires a proper legal basis. On Issue 2: The Supreme Court definitively ruled that an unborn foetus is not endowed with juridical personality under the Civil Code of the Philippines. The Court explained that 'la criatura abortiva no alcanza la categoria de persona natural y en consscuencia es un ser no nacido a la vida del Derecho,' meaning it is a being not yet born into the life of Law and thus incapable of having rights and obligations. Article 2206 of the Civil Code, which fixes a minimum award for the death of a person, does not cover the case of an unborn foetus because it is not considered a 'person.' The provisional personality of a conceived child (conceptus pro nato habetur) under Article 40 of the Civil Code is explicitly conditioned on the child being subsequently born alive, a condition indisputably not met in this case as the child was dead when separated from its mother's womb. Consequently, no transmission of rights could take place from a being that lacked juridical personality. On Issue 3: The Supreme Court found no basis for awarding moral or exemplary damages. While parents may be entitled to moral damages for distress and anguish and the disappointment of parental expectations (Article 2217), and exemplary damages if warranted (Article 2230), the lower courts did not find a basis for such an award in this case. The Court noted the appellee's (Oscar Lazo) apparent indifference to his wife's previous abortions, also caused by the appellant, which clearly indicated a lack of concern for the frustration of his parental hopes and affections. The evidence showed Lazo was aware of the second abortion and likely the first, yet he took no steps to investigate or secure the punishment of the responsible practitioner. His subsequent actions, including abandoning administrative and criminal cases in favor of a civil action for an exaggerated amount, reinforced the view that his concern was mercenary rather than high-minded outrage, thereby negating the emotional suffering required for moral damages.

Main Doctrine

A husband cannot recover damages from a physician for the abortion of his wife, as an unborn fetus does not possess juridical personality and thus cannot be the subject of an action for damages. While parents may be entitled to moral damages for distress and anguish, such damages were denied in this case due to the husband's apparent indifference to previous abortions and his mercenary pursuit of the claim.

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