Fernandez-Subido v. Lacson
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Priscilla Fernandez-Subido, a substitute then regular school physician in Manila, sought a writ of mandamus and prohibition against the City Mayor, Arsenio Lacson. Subido claimed she was unlawfully denied appointment to one of four newly created school physician positions, alleging the denial was politically motivated due to her brother-in-law's opposition to the mayor. She argued this violated civil service rules and that the Municipal Board had recommended her for the position. Procedural History: Subido filed an action for mandamus and prohibition in the lower court. The respondent mayor filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that the power of appointment is an executive function involving discretion and cannot be controlled by mandamus. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, leading to the present appeal by Subido. The Petition: The petitioner-appellant contends that the ordinance creating the positions was intended to allow the mayor to appoint individuals, including herself, who were already serving. However, the Supreme Court found that the ordinance clearly created new positions within the Health Department, distinct from those in the Division of City Schools, and that appointments to these new positions were vested in the mayor, not the Secretary of Education. The Court further held that mandamus is inappropriate as there was no clear legal duty for the mayor to appoint Subido, nor a clear legal right for her to be appointed, emphasizing that the power of appointment is an executive function not subject to judicial control. The Court also noted Subido's failure to exhaust administrative remedies by appealing to the President or the relevant department head.
Issue(s)
Whether the writ of mandamus can compel the respondent mayor to appoint the petitioner to the newly created position of school physician. Whether the respondent mayor acted with grave abuse of discretion in refusing to appoint the petitioner.
Ruling
The order of dismissal appealed from is hereby affirmed.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of mandamus and the power of appointment: The Court held that the power of appointment is an executive function vested in the mayor, involving the exercise of discretion, and cannot be controlled by the courts through a writ of mandamus. The writ of mandamus only issues when there is a clear legal duty imposed upon the officer and a clear legal right to the appointment in favor of the petitioner. In this case, the ordinance created new positions in the Health Department, distinct from the petitioner's previous position in the Division of City Schools, and the appointments to these new positions were vested in the mayor. The Court emphasized the principle of separation of powers, stating that the judiciary cannot interfere with the executive's discretion in choosing appointees. The Court noted that the ordinance did not expressly declare that the positions were for those then employed in the Division of City Schools, which would have circumscribed the mayor's power. Therefore, the petitioner did not have a clear legal right to the appointment, and the mayor did not have a clear legal duty to appoint her. On the issue of grave abuse of discretion: The Court found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the mayor. The refusal to appoint the petitioner was based on the mayor's discretion in exercising his executive function of appointment. The Court reiterated that the power of appointment is intrinsically an administrative or executive function involving the exercise of discretion. Since the petitioner did not possess a clear legal right to the appointment, the mayor's decision not to appoint her, even if influenced by political considerations or personal judgment, did not constitute grave abuse of discretion that would warrant judicial intervention. The Court also noted that the petitioner had not exhausted all administrative remedies, as an appeal to the President of the Philippines or the Department Head was not shown to have been made.
Main Doctrine
The power of appointment is an executive function involving discretion and cannot be controlled by the courts through a writ of mandamus, absent a clear legal duty and a clear legal right to the appointment.