Villanueva v. Castañeda
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioners claimed a right to remain and conduct business in a strip of land measuring 12 by 77 meters near the public market of San Fernando, Pampanga, where they had constructed vendor stalls forming a talipapa. This right was allegedly based on a previous authorization from the municipal government. Respondents justified the demolition of their stalls as illegal constructions on public property. Procedural History: On November 7, 1961, the municipal council authorized members of the Fernandino United Merchants and Traders Association to construct permanent stalls. This was protested, leading to a preliminary injunction in Civil Case No. 2040. On January 18, 1964, the municipal council adopted Resolution No. 29, declaring the area a parking place and public plaza, implicitly revoking the prior resolution. In 1968, the Court of First Instance ruled that the land was public and beyond the commerce of man, making the injunction permanent. Despite this, petitioners were not evicted and in 1971 were assigned spaces for which they paid daily fees. On January 12, 1982, the Association of Concerned Citizens and Consumers filed a petition for the implementation of Resolution No. 29. Consequently, on June 14, 1982, respondent Vicente A. Macalino, Officer-in-Charge, Office of the Mayor, ordered the demolition of the stalls. Petitioners filed a petition for prohibition, which was denied by the respondent judge on July 19, 1982, and a motion for reconsideration on August 5, 1982. The Petition: Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court to challenge the denial of their petition for prohibition, seeking to annul the demolition order.
Issue(s)
Whether the subject area, being a public plaza, can be the subject of lease or any other contractual undertaking. Whether the respondent mayor acted without authority or whimsically in ordering the demolition of the stalls. Whether the exercise of police power to clear a public plaza, even if it affects alleged lease agreements, violates the impairment clause of contracts.
Ruling
The petition is dismissed. The decision dated July 19, 1982, and the order dated August 5, 1982, are affirmed. The temporary restraining order dated August 9, 1982, is lifted. This decision is immediately executory.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Supreme Court ruled that a public plaza is beyond the commerce of man and, as such, cannot be the subject of lease or any other contractual undertaking. This principle is elementary and was settled as early as 1915 in Municipality of Cavite vs. Rojas, which declared null and void the lease of a portion of a public plaza for private use. Article 344 of the Civil Code explicitly defines property for public use, including squares and streets, as beyond the commerce of man, making them unsuitable objects for contracts under Article 1271 of the Civil Code. The Court emphasized that the municipal council exceeded its authority in attempting to lease a portion of the plaza for private benefit, as reinforced by Muyot vs. de la Fuente and Espiritu vs. Municipal Council of Pozorrubio, which both affirmed that public spaces like sidewalks and town plazas cannot be leased for market stalls or residences. Therefore, the petitioners had no right to occupy the premises based on alleged lease contracts. On Issue 2: The Supreme Court found that the respondent mayor, as officer-in-charge, did not act without authority or whimsically in ordering the demolition of the stalls. His actions were directly aimed at enforcing the unappealed decision in Civil Case No. 2040, which declared the area a public plaza, and Resolution No. 29, series of 1964, which reiterated its designation as a parking place and public plaza. The Court held that the mayor had a duty to clear the area and restore it to its intended public use. Furthermore, his decision was not whimsical, as an investigation was conducted by the municipal attorney following a complaint from concerned citizens, and petitioners were notified but chose to disregard the hearing. The factual findings, supported by photographs, indicated the necessity of clearing the congested, unsightly, and unsanitary talipapa, which posed fire hazards, obstructed traffic, and denied the public proper use of the plaza. On Issue 3: Even assuming, arguendo, the validity of any lease agreements, the Supreme Court held that the exercise of police power, as delegated to the municipality through the general welfare clause (Section 2238, Revised Administrative Code), could effectively terminate such agreements without violating the impairment clause. The Court reiterated the settled doctrine that police power cannot be surrendered or bargained away through contract, as every contract affecting public interest contains an implied reservation of this paramount power. Citing Stone v. Mississippi and Ortigas & Co. v. Feati Bank, the Court affirmed that police power can be activated at any time to change or abrogate contractual provisions for the promotion of general welfare. Therefore, Resolution No. 29, series of 1964, was a valid exercise of police power to address issues of public health, safety, order, and convenience caused by the talipapa's presence.
Main Doctrine
A public plaza is property of public dominion, beyond the commerce of man, and cannot be the subject of lease or any other contractual undertaking. Municipalities cannot dispose of or lease portions of public plazas for private use, as such contracts are null and void. The exercise of police power for the general welfare can override contractual obligations affecting public interest.