Quiogue v. Bautista

G.R. No. L-13159 · 1962-02-28 · J. BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.: · Primary: Civil; Secondary: Commercial
REITERATION

Facts

The Antecedents: Plaintiffs-appellees instituted an action to foreclose two deeds of mortgage executed on May 9, 1944, and October 11, 1944, to secure two loans amounting to P2,000.00 and P6,000.00, respectively. A common provision stipulated that the loans could not be repaid within one year from the termination of the last world war. Procedural History: The defendants-appellants raised defenses that the action was premature, barred by a prior case (Civil Case No. 11969) between the same parties, and that any recoverable amount should be computed according to the Ballantyne schedule. They also filed a counterclaim for moral damages. The trial court rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiffs, ordering the defendants to pay P12,829.81 with interest, and in default of payment, the mortgaged properties were to be sold at public auction. The Petition: Defendants appealed the trial court's decision, raising purely questions of law. They contended that the trial court erred in not dismissing the case as premature, in not finding the case barred by the decision in Civil Case No. 11969, and in not converting the recoverable amounts under the Ballantyne scale of values.

Issue(s)

Whether the action to foreclose the mortgages was premature. Whether the present action was barred by the decision rendered in Civil Case No. 11969. Whether the recoverable amounts should be converted into money according to the Ballantyne scale of values.

Ruling

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court, holding that the action was not premature, not barred by the prior case, and that the amounts due should be paid on a peso-for-peso basis, not according to the Ballantyne schedule. The Court denied the defendants' motion to set aside the decision and order a new trial.

Ratio Decidendi

On the issue of prematurity: The Court held that the interpretation that the war did not terminate for the Philippines until July 23, 1956, is untenable. Citing Navarre v. Barreto, et al., the Court stated that in the legal sense, war formally ended in the Philippines on December 31, 1946, with President Truman's proclamation of peace. Even if a formal treaty was considered, the treaty of peace with Japan was signed on September 8, 1951. Therefore, the action filed on June 23, 1956, was not premature as the war had legally terminated. On the issue of the case being barred by a prior judgment: The contention that the action was barred by Civil Case No. 11969 was deemed untenable because the first case involved a different transaction from those covered in the present case. The Court clarified that Section 3, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court, regarding the splitting of a single cause of action, does not apply when there are several causes of action referring to different transactions. The non-payment of a loan secured by a mortgage constitutes a single cause of action, and a creditor cannot split this into separate complaints for payment and foreclosure. However, in this instance, the two cases involved distinct transactions, thus not violating the rule against splitting causes of action. On the issue of the Ballantyne scale of values: The Court sustained the trial court's ruling that the recoverable amounts should not be converted according to the Ballantyne scale. The established rule is that where an obligation incurred during the Japanese occupation was made payable after a fixed period, with maturity falling after liberation, the promissor must pay in Philippine currency the same amount stated in the obligation, meaning a peso-for-peso settlement. The promissor cannot discharge the debt by paying only the equivalent in Philippine currency of the value of the military notes received.

Main Doctrine

The termination of the last world war for legal purposes in the Philippines is determined by official proclamations or treaties, not by the subjective interpretation of parties. Furthermore, distinct loan obligations arising from different transactions constitute separate causes of action, thus precluding the application of the rule against splitting causes of action. Obligations incurred during the Japanese occupation, payable after liberation, are settled on a peso-for-peso basis.

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