Lloren v. De Veyra
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: Petitioner, Justice of the Peace Lloren, was conducting a preliminary examination of witnesses at the Baguio Gold Mining Company compound. During the proceedings, Alan A. Bakewell, the company's general superintendent, interrupted and insulted a witness. In response, Lloren suspended the examination and issued a contempt citation against Bakewell. 2. Procedural History: Bakewell submitted a written explanation which Lloren deemed insufficient. Lloren then ordered Bakewell to appear personally, and upon failure to do so, issued a warrant for his arrest. Bakewell was arrested but subsequently released on a writ of preliminary injunction issued by the Court of First Instance, which had taken cognizance of Bakewell's petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion by Lloren. The Court of First Instance, presided over by respondent Judge De Veyra, ruled that Lloren committed an abuse of discretion and made the injunction permanent. Lloren received this decision on March 18, 1958, filed a motion for reconsideration on April 2, 1958, which was denied on April 14, 1958. Lloren received the denial on April 16, 1958, and filed his notice of appeal and appeal bond on April 17, 1958. Judge De Veyra denied the appeal as tardy, leading to the present petition. 3. The Petition: This case is a petition for mandamus filed by Justice of the Peace Lloren, seeking to compel the respondent court to give due course to his appeal. The core issue is the computation of the reglementary period for appeal. Lloren contends that his appeal was perfected within the 15-day period, arguing that filing the motion for reconsideration on the 15th day interrupted the period, and he was entitled to a full day after receiving the denial. The respondent court's position, as argued by Bakewell's counsel, is that the appeal was filed on the 16th day, based on a different method of computation.
Issue(s)
Was the appeal interposed by petitioner Jose T. Lloren perfected within the reglementary period of 15 days?
Ruling
The petition is granted. The respondent court is ordered to give due course to petitioner's appeal, with costs against respondent Alan A. Bakewell.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Supreme Court held that the appeal interposed by petitioner Jose T. Lloren was perfected within the reglementary period of 15 days. The Court, after mature deliberation, resolved not to follow the methods of computation previously adopted in Federal Films, Inc. v. Judge of the First Instance of Manila and Taroma v. Cruz and Galinato, but instead decided to adhere strictly to the rule of computation embodied in Rule 28 of the Rules of Court. This rule dictates that the first day should be excluded and the last day included in counting periods. Lloren received the CFI decision on March 18, 1958, and filed his motion for reconsideration on April 2, 1958, which constitutes exactly 14 days from March 19 to April 1 (excluding March 18 and including April 1). Since April 2 was the 15th day, the filing of the motion for reconsideration on this day interrupted the period, and this day (April 2) is excluded from the count of days elapsed. When Lloren received the order denying his motion for reconsideration on April 16, 1958, he still had one day remaining of the reglementary period. Applying Rule 28 again to this remaining day, the day of receipt (April 16) is excluded, and the next day (April 17, 1958) is included as the last day to perfect the appeal. Therefore, the filing of the appeal bond and notice of appeal on April 17, 1958, was exactly within the reglementary period.
Main Doctrine
The filing of a motion for reconsideration on the 15th day of the appeal period interrupts the period, and the remaining day(s) are counted from receipt of the denial, excluding the day of receipt and including the next day for filing the appeal.