Gutierrez v. Medel
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Plaintiff Lino Gutierrez filed a complaint for the recovery of a P10,000.00 loan, evidenced by a deed of second real estate mortgage with conditional assumption of a pre-existing first mortgage, against defendants Luciano L. Medel and Luz P. Medel. The loan was due and demandable. The defendants admitted the loan and mortgage but claimed a verbal extension until May 5, 1958. Procedural History: The case underwent several postponements at the defendants' instance. On March 28, 1958, the court explicitly warned that if the defendants were not prepared to present their evidence on May 16, 1958, the case would be submitted for decision. On May 13, 1958, defendants' new counsel filed an urgent motion for transfer of the May 16 hearing, citing another engagement. On May 16, 1958, no counsel or defendants appeared. The plaintiff objected to further postponement, and the court denied the motion for transfer, submitting the case for decision based on plaintiff's evidence. No motion for reconsideration was filed. On July 12, 1958, the lower court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff. On August 15, 1958, defendants filed a motion for reconsideration of the May 16 order, which was denied on August 25, 1958. The Petition: The defendants appealed, claiming the lower court erred in denying their motion for transfer, thereby depriving them of their day in court.
Issue(s)
Whether the lower court erred in denying the defendants' motion for postponement and submitting the case for decision on the plaintiff's evidence. Whether the defendants were deprived of their day in court.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court, holding that the defendants were not deprived of their day in court and that the repeated requests for continuance appeared to be a delaying tactic. The Court found no valid defense offered by the defendants, who had admitted the indebtedness and the mortgage.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of denial of postponement and submission of the case for decision: The Supreme Court found that the trial court was liberal in granting three previous postponements. The order dated March 28, 1958, clearly stated that the case would be considered submitted for decision if the defendants were not prepared to present their evidence on May 16, 1958. This provided ample time for the defendants to engage new counsel or prepare their evidence. The Court emphasized that continuances are granted for good cause alleged and proved, not merely at the will of the parties. The defendants' failure to appear on May 16, 1958, despite the clear warning and the fact that their motion for continuance had not been acted upon favorably, constituted a voluntary waiver of their right to present evidence. The Court cited Cruz v. Malabayabas, et al., G.R. No. L-11334, May 15, 1959, stating that continuances are not granted merely at the will of the parties. Furthermore, the Court noted that even if the additional counsel had a prior engagement, the original counsel had not withdrawn from the case, and the defendants had no right to presume that their motion for continuance would be granted. The Court also referenced I Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, citing Macondray & Co. v. Paredes, G.R. No. 38255, Sept. 5, 1933, and Sunico v. Villapando, 14 Phil. 352, stating that a party moving for postponement must be in court if the motion is not acted upon favorably. The Court also cited Linis v. Rovira, 61 Phil. 137, regarding the ethical duty of an attorney who knows they cannot appear on a scheduled date. On the issue of deprivation of their day in court: The Supreme Court held that the defendants were not deprived of their day in court. Their absence on May 16, 1958, was a result of their own volition, presumably assuming their motion for continuance would be granted. The Court reiterated that such an assumption is not a right, as continuances require good cause. The defendants' failure to appear and present their evidence, after being given sufficient warning and opportunities, meant they voluntarily relinquished their right to be heard. The Court found that the repeated requests for continuance were likely a delaying tactic, especially since the defendants had admitted the indebtedness and the mortgage, and their alleged verbal extension was not supported by the record, which showed the only extension was up to September 23, 1957.
Main Doctrine
A party who fails to appear at a scheduled hearing, despite clear warnings and previous postponements, and whose motion for continuance is denied, cannot claim deprivation of their day in court; they are deemed to have voluntarily waived their right to present evidence.