Tan v. Mason
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Plaintiff-appellee Soledad Tan filed a suit for damages against Carlos Dimayuga after sustaining physical injuries as a passenger in Dimayuga's taxicab. Dimayuga subsequently filed a third-party complaint against Walter Mason, whose car had collided with the taxicab, causing the injuries. Procedural History: Mason filed a motion to dismiss the third-party complaint. Dimayuga, unaware of Mason's motion, filed a motion to declare Mason in default, which the court granted. Mason was informed that his motion to dismiss was received late and could no longer be acted upon. Soledad Tan filed an amended complaint, and Mason filed an answer, including a counterclaim, a cross-claim against Dimayuga, and a third-party complaint against the taxicab driver. Dimayuga moved to dismiss the cross-claim and to strike out the motion for leave to file the third-party complaint. The lower court granted these motions, stating that allowing the cross-claim would circumvent the default order, and striking out the motion for leave to file due to lack of proof of service. Mason's motion for reconsideration was denied, leading to this appeal. The Appeal: Walter Mason appealed the orders of the lower court, assigning as errors the denial of his motion to set aside the order of default, the refusal to resolve his motion to dismiss the third-party complaint, the dismissal of his cross-claim, and the striking out of his motion for leave to file a third-party complaint.
Issue(s)
Whether the lower court erred in not setting aside the order of default against Walter Mason. Whether the lower court erred in refusing to resolve Walter Mason's motion to dismiss the third-party complaint. Whether the lower court erred in ordering the dismissal of Walter Mason's cross-claim against Carlos Dimayuga. Whether the lower court erred in ordering the striking out of Walter Mason's motion for leave to file a third-party complaint.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the orders of the lower court. The appeal was found to be devoid of merit. The case was remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings, with costs against appellant Mason.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1 (Order of Default): The Supreme Court held that the order of default was rendered on January 14, 1958. The proper remedy for Mason to set aside this order should have been a petition for relief under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, filed within sixty days after learning of the order and not more than six months after its entry. The record showed no such petition was filed. Mason's first prayer to set aside the default order was in a "Petition and Motion for Reconsideration" filed on December 16, 1958, eleven months after the entry of the default order, which was clearly beyond the reglementary period provided by Rule 38. Therefore, the lower court did not err in not setting aside the order of default. On Issue 2 (Motion to Dismiss Third-Party Complaint): Having failed to have the order of default vacated, appellant Mason lost his right to expect his motion to dismiss the third-party complaint to be acted upon. Furthermore, the Court noted Mason's apparent heedlessness regarding his motion to dismiss, which requested a hearing on January 11, 1958. Neither Mason nor his counsel appeared in court on that date, and no pleading or motion from Mason was found in the record. This indicated that Mason did not ensure his pleading reached the court. Even if the motion was sent by registered mail, Mason should have followed up upon being informed that it was received late, and should have inquired about the status of the third-party complaint and the default order, which he failed to do. Thus, the lower court did not err in refusing to resolve the motion to dismiss. On Issue 3 (Dismissal of Cross-Claim): The Supreme Court found no error in the dismissal of Mason's cross-claim against Dimayuga. The cross-claim was filed after Mason had been declared in default. The lower court correctly reasoned that allowing the cross-claim to stand would be tantamount to setting aside the order of default indirectly, which cannot be permitted. A party declared in default loses his standing in court, and allowing a cross-claim would effectively grant him a standing he had already forfeited. On Issue 4 (Striking Out Motion for Leave to File Third-Party Complaint): The Supreme Court upheld the lower court's action of striking out Mason's motion for leave to file a third-party complaint due to lack of proof of service. Citing established jurisprudence, the Court stated that without proof of service, a motion is considered a mere scrap of paper that the clerk of court should not receive for filing. This ruling justified the lower court's action.
Main Doctrine
The Supreme Court reiterated that a party declared in default must avail of the remedy of a petition for relief under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court within the prescribed periods to set aside the order of default. Failure to do so, or to file such a petition within the reglementary period, bars any subsequent attempt to have the default order vacated. Moreover, motions that lack proof of service, as required by the Rules of Court, are considered invalid and may be stricken from the record, preventing any substantive consideration by the court.