Fabian v. Mencias
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: This case originated from a civil suit filed in the Justice of the Peace Court of Caloocan, Rizal, by Pedro Interior against Lorenzo and Albano Fabian. Interior sought to collect P925.51, plus interest and attorney's fees, representing the alleged unpaid balance for gasoline and other goods purchased on credit by the Fabians. 2. Procedural History: After a judgment was rendered in favor of Interior in the Justice of the Peace Court, the Fabians appealed to the Court of First Instance of Rizal. Following several postponements, the plaintiff rested his case. The defendants moved for a postponement, which was denied, and the case was submitted for decision. The Court of First Instance dismissed the case, finding that the payments made by the defendants exceeded the value of the goods purchased. Interior then filed a pleading titled "PETITION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT," which the court treated as a motion for new trial. This motion was denied. Subsequently, Interior filed an "URGENT MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL" based on the same grounds, which was also denied as the decision had become final. However, a motion for reconsideration of this denial was granted, setting aside the decision and ordering a new trial. 3. The Petition: The petitioners (Fabian) filed a petition for certiorari, arguing that the respondent judge acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in granting the motion for reconsideration and setting the case for a new trial. They contended that the decision of September 6, 1958, had already become final and executory. The petition highlights that Interior's initial petition for relief, treated as a motion for new trial, did not suspend the period of appeal, and his subsequent motions were filed out of time, rendering the order for a new trial invalid.
Issue(s)
Whether the respondent judge acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in granting the motion for reconsideration and setting aside the decision that had already become final and executory. Whether the petition for relief from judgment, treated as a motion for new trial, suspended the running of the period of appeal. Whether the subsequent "urgent motion for new trial" was filed within the reglementary period.
Ruling
The petition for certiorari is granted. The order of May 4, 1959, granting the motion for reconsideration and setting aside the decision, is annulled. Costs against respondent Pedro Interior.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of whether the respondent judge acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion: The Supreme Court held that the respondent judge did act with grave abuse of discretion. The Court found that the decision rendered by the CFI on September 6, 1958, had already become final and executory when the motion for reconsideration was filed on January 26, 1959. The filing of a second motion for new trial, based on grounds already raised in a prior motion, is not permitted under the Rules of Court and does not suspend the period of appeal. Therefore, the judge exceeded his jurisdiction in setting aside a final and executory judgment. On the issue of whether the petition for relief from judgment suspended the period of appeal: The Court clarified that the petition for relief from judgment, as admitted by the plaintiff himself, was in reality a motion for new trial. According to Rule 17, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, a second motion for new trial may only be allowed if based on a ground not existing when the first motion was made. In this case, the grounds relied upon in the second motion were identical to those in the first petition for relief. Therefore, the filing of the petition for relief did not suspend the running of the period of appeal. On the issue of whether the subsequent "urgent motion for new trial" was filed within the reglementary period: The Court determined that the period of appeal had already expired. The plaintiff received notice of the judgment on October 7, 1958. He filed his petition for relief (motion for new trial) on October 18, 1958, consuming eleven days of the appeal period. The period was suspended until December 15, 1958, when he received notice of the denial. The appeal period resumed on December 16, 1958, and expired nineteen days later, on January 3, 1959. Consequently, the motion for reconsideration filed on January 26, 1959, was filed out of time, as the decision had become final and executory on January 3, 1959.
Main Doctrine
A second motion for new trial, based on grounds already raised in a prior motion, is considered out of order and does not suspend the running of the period of appeal. Consequently, a motion for reconsideration filed after the decision has become final and executory cannot revive the lost period to appeal.