Gregorio v. Mencias
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: The underlying dispute concerns the possession of two fishponds, formerly Lots Nos. 48 and 61, now Lots Nos. 5 and 7, Block 22, Loñgos Estate. These lots were originally leased from the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila. The leasehold rights were eventually held by Mercedes N. de Relucio. In 1952, Relucio leased these fishponds to Pilar Gregorio for four years, ending August 5, 1956. Upon expiration, Gregorio refused to vacate, leading Relucio to file an unlawful detainer case. Gregorio claimed possession under a lease with the Land Tenure Administration, a claim that was finalized after the unlawful detainer case was filed. 2. Procedural History: Following Gregorio's refusal to vacate, Relucio filed an unlawful detainer case (Civil Case No. 1340) in the JP Court of Malabon, Rizal, which she won. Gregorio appealed to the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Civil Case No. 4640). The Land Tenure Administration's petition to intervene in this appeal was denied. In the Court of First Instance, Relucio filed a motion for a preliminary mandatory injunction to regain possession, which was granted by the respondent judge via an order dated May 30, 1959. A subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied on September 17, 1959. The petitioners, Gregorio and Tuason, are now before this Court seeking to annul these two orders. 3. The Petition: Petitioners Pilar Gregorio and Pacifico Tuason filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus to annul the orders of May 30, 1959, and September 17, 1959, issued by the respondent judge. They contend that the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion by issuing the preliminary mandatory injunction. Their arguments include that Relucio's motion for the injunction was filed out of time, that the judge granted the motion without sufficient evidence, and that their appeal in the lower court was not frivolous as they possessed a valid defense of having a new lease with the Land Tenure Administration. They seek to be restored to the possession of the two lots.
Issue(s)
Whether the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the orders for preliminary mandatory injunction. Whether the motion for preliminary mandatory injunction was filed within the reglementary period prescribed by law. Whether the respondent judge granted the motion for preliminary mandatory injunction without receiving sufficient evidence. Whether the petitioners' appeal in the unlawful detainer case was frivolous or dilatory.
Ruling
The petition for certiorari and mandamus is dismissed for lack of merit. The orders of the respondent Judge dated May 30, 1959, and September 17, 1959, are affirmed. The writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued by this Court is dissolved.
Ratio Decidendi
On the timeliness of the motion for preliminary mandatory injunction: The Court reiterated its ruling in De la Cruz v. Bocar that the ten-day period for filing a motion for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction under Article 1674 of the Civil Code should be counted from the date the petitioning party is notified of the perfection of the appeal, not from the actual date of perfection. The Court reasoned that a literal interpretation would render the remedy unavailing, as records are often transmitted beyond the specified periods, and the appellee is not expected to file before receiving official notice from the appellate court. In this case, respondent Relucio filed her motion for injunction on September 2, 1957, before she had even received notice of the appealed case, meaning the period of limitation had not commenced. The Court found no potent reasons to alter this established ruling, which aims to prevent undue prolongation of possession by the lessee during an appeal. On the reception of evidence: The contention that the trial court granted the motion without receiving evidence was found to be untrue. The Court noted that the lower court had set the motion for hearing on multiple occasions (September 14, 1957, and May 23, 1959) specifically for the purpose of receiving evidence. Both parties presented exhibits during these hearings. The respondent court considered the evidence submitted by both parties, the pleadings filed, and the decision of the Justice of the Peace Court as bases for granting the writ. Furthermore, the petitioners' counsel, as shown by the stenographic notes, submitted the matter of the injunction's issuance to the court for resolution, implying they did not press for further evidence reception at that stage. On whether the appeal was frivolous or dilatory: The Court found that the petitioners' claim of possessing the fishponds as lessees of the Land Tenure Administration (LTA) was not supported by the evidence and contradicted their own statements. In their application for purchase with the LTA in August 1956, Gregorio stated she had been an occupant since August 5, 1952. The LTA denied her application, noting she was a lessee of Relucio since 1952. Gregorio reiterated her occupancy in subsequent letters to the LTA. While she negotiated for a lease with the LTA after her purchase application was denied, the bond finalizing that lease was approved on October 18, 1956, one day after the unlawful detainer case was filed. This timeline indicated that at the time of filing the detainer case, her possession was still under the lease with Relucio. The Court invoked Article 1436 of the Civil Code, stating that a possessor who acknowledges the title of the lessor cannot assert a right adverse to that title. Therefore, their defense of a new lease with the LTA was not a valid basis to claim the appeal was not frivolous. On the merits of the injunction and the petitioners' right to possession: The Court found that respondent Relucio and her predecessors had long been in possession as lessees of the MITRA, introducing substantial improvements. Petitioner Gregorio had agreed to turn over improvements upon lease expiration. Given the circumstances, the Court concluded that the respondent judge did not act without or in excess of jurisdiction, nor was there grave abuse of discretion. The petitioners failed to establish a clear right that would render the judge's refusal to restore possession an unlawful exclusion.
Main Doctrine
The ten-day period for filing a motion for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction in ejectment cases, as provided under Article 1674 in relation to Article 539 of the Civil Code, should be counted from the date the petitioning party is notified of the perfection of the appeal, not from the actual date of perfection.