Lasala v. Fernandez

G.R. No. L-16628 · 1962-05-23 · J. PADILLA, J.: · Primary: Civil; Secondary: Remedial
REITERATION

Facts

1. The Antecedents: The underlying dispute concerns the possession of a parcel of land, Lot No. 283 of La Carlota Cadastre, Negros Occidental. The petitioners, Vivencio Lasala and Estela Francisco de Lasala, claim ownership of the land, having purchased it from the Philippine National Bank on April 9, 1952. However, the respondents, Remigio Pillado and Pedro Sarnate, have been in possession of the land, which was previously mortgaged by Luis Pillado, Remigio's father, to the Philippine National Bank. The Bank foreclosed the mortgage and purchased the property on September 13, 1952. 2. Procedural History: The petitioners initiated Civil Case No. 2458 to recover possession of the land and seek damages for illegal occupation, along with a preliminary injunction. A writ of preliminary injunction was initially issued on October 30, 1952, enjoining the defendants from further dispossession. The defendants posted bonds in the sums of P500 in 1956 and P500 in 1957 to answer for the value of the palay harvests. On October 28, 1958, the petitioners moved for another bond for the 1958 palay crop, which the court ordered on December 6, 1958. However, the respondents did not file the bond. Instead, on March 17, 1959, the respondent court set aside its previous order, declared the writ of preliminary injunction improvidently issued, and denied the motion for the 1958 bond. A motion for reconsideration was denied on January 13, 1960. 3. The Petition: The petitioners are seeking a writ of certiorari to annul the respondent court's order of March 17, 1959, which set aside the order requiring the respondents to post a bond for the 1958 palay harvest and declared the preliminary injunction improvidently issued. The petitioners argue that the legality of the preliminary injunction was not definitively passed upon in a prior certiorari proceeding (G.R. No. L-6663). They contend that the purpose of the injunction was to maintain the status quo and that the respondent court has the power to modify or recall such writs as justice requires, citing Section 7 of Rule 60 and Aquino vs. Alvendia.

Issue(s)

1. Whether the legality or validity of the writ of preliminary injunction in question was passed upon by the Supreme Court in the previous certiorari proceedings G.R. No. L-6663. 2. Whether the respondent court gravely abused its discretion in setting aside its previous order requiring a bond and in declaring the preliminary injunction improvidently issued. 3. Whether a court has the power to recall or modify a writ of preliminary injunction previously issued by it.

Ruling

The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied. The order of the respondent court dated March 17, 1959, declaring the writ of preliminary injunction improvidently issued and denying the motion to require the defendants to file a bond for the 1958 palay crop is sustained.

Ratio Decidendi

On Issue 1: The Supreme Court held that the legality or validity of the writ of preliminary injunction in question was not passed upon in the prior certiorari proceedings, G.R. No. L-6663, decided on July 30, 1954. The Court explicitly quoted its pronouncement from that earlier case, stating, "The alleged invalidity of the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction has not been insisted upon in the argument, and it is not necessary for us to pass upon the same." This statement clearly indicates that the issue of the injunction's validity was left unresolved in the previous ruling. Therefore, the petitioners' contention that the matter had already been settled by the Supreme Court lacked basis. On Issue 2: The Supreme Court ruled that the respondent court did not gravely abuse its discretion in setting aside its previous order and declaring the preliminary injunction improvidently issued. The Court emphasized that the purpose of a writ of preliminary injunction is to maintain or preserve the status quo of the parties in relation to the subject matter litigated during the pendency of the action or case. In the present instance, the respondent Remigio Pillado was in actual possession of the litigated lot, having inherited it from his parents, and the petitioners had never been in possession. Disturbing the respondents' existing possession through an injunction would not preserve the status quo but rather alter it. Since the primary objective of an injunction is to prevent change in the existing state of affairs, the preliminary injunction was indeed improvidently issued, as it sought to dispossess a party already in actual possession. On Issue 3: The Supreme Court affirmed that a court has the power to recall or modify a writ of preliminary injunction previously issued by it. This power is expressly provided for in Section 7 of Rule 60 of the Rules of Court, which states that "After hearing the court may grant or refuse, continue, modify or dissolve the injunction as justice may require." The Court further reiterated its holding in Aquino vs. Alvendia, G.R. No. L-13861, 8 August 1958, that "the issuance or recall of a preliminary writ of injunction is, as we have said, an interlocutory matter that remains at all times within the control of the Court." This principle underscores the inherent authority of a court to correct its own interlocutory orders, ensuring that such provisional remedies are applied justly and in accordance with their intended purpose.

Main Doctrine

The purpose of a writ of preliminary injunction is to maintain or preserve the status quo of the parties in relation to the subject matter litigated by them during the pendency of the action or case. A court has the power to recall or modify a writ of preliminary injunction previously issued by it, as such issuance or recall is an interlocutory matter that remains at all times within the control of the Court.

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