Valderrama Lumber Manufacturers' Co. v. Cusi
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: In Civil Case No. 3125 before the Court of First Instance of Davao, judgment was rendered against Valderrama Lumber Manufacturers' Co., Inc. (petitioner) for P29,683.32 in damages. These damages arose from a vehicular collision involving one of the corporation's trucks, driven by Perfecto Veras, who was found guilty of homicide and physical injuries through reckless negligence in a separate criminal case. The driver's insolvency led to the corporation's subsidiary liability as employer. The victims were Francisco Ang, Pablo Albios, Avelina Chaves (widow of Carlos Chaves), and the heirs of Carlos Chaves. Procedural History: Petitioner received a copy of the judgment on March 30, 1960. On the same date, the awardees filed a motion for immediate execution of the judgment pending appeal, with a hearing scheduled for the following day. Petitioner opposed the motion, citing non-compliance with the three-day notice rule and arguing that the motion was groundless and premature. Respondent Judge Cusi, Jr. granted the motion, opining that any appeal by the corporation would be for delay, as its defense was a mere denial without supporting facts admissible in evidence. The Petition: Petitioner Valderrama Lumber Manufacturers' Co., Inc. filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition to annul the order of execution pending appeal. They alleged that the sheriff had already levied on logs worth P42,000.00, prompting the Supreme Court to issue a writ of preliminary injunction. Respondents argued that the order was issued for good cause, that the three-day notice could be waived, and that petitioner had an adequate remedy at law by filing a supersedeas bond.
Issue(s)
Whether the respondent Judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in ordering the execution of the judgment pending appeal despite the pendency of the appeal and the alleged non-compliance with the three-day notice rule. Whether the petitioner had an adequate remedy at law to stay the execution.
Ruling
The petition is dismissed. The Supreme Court issued a preliminary injunction, which is now dissolved, with the understanding that petitioner will be given 10 days from the finality of the decision to file a supersedeas bond. If no bond is filed within the said period, the order of execution shall be carried out.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Court found no clear abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent Judge in ordering the execution pending appeal. The Court noted that the lower court's decision indicated that the corporation's defense consisted of a mere denial unsupported by admissible evidence. This suggested that the appeal might indeed be for the purpose of delay, a factor that could be considered a "good reason" for execution pending appeal under Section 2 of Rule 39. The Court emphasized that the discretion to grant execution pending appeal rests with the trial court, and such discretion will not be interfered with unless it is exercised arbitrarily or with grave abuse. On Issue 2: The Court pointed out that Section 2 of Rule 39 explicitly provides for the remedy of a supersedeas bond to stay execution pending appeal. It was admitted that the petitioner never offered to file such a bond in the lower court. While the petitioner alleged solvency, it did not demonstrate any attempt to avail itself of the statutory remedy. Therefore, the Court concluded that the petitioner had an adequate remedy at law, which it failed to pursue, making the petition for certiorari and prohibition unnecessary.
Main Doctrine
The Court affirmed that execution pending appeal, as provided under Section 2 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, may be granted by the court in its discretion upon good reasons stated in a special order. The rule also provides that such execution may be stayed by the filing of a sufficient supersedeas bond by the appellant, conditioned for the performance of the judgment if affirmed.