Duque v. Santiago
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioners sought to annul an order of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan denying their motion to quash an information for libel filed against them. The information was filed upon complaint by Governor Conrado F. Estrella and prayed for P200,000 in damages. Procedural History: Petitioners filed an Omnibus Motion praying for a transfer of venue, quashing of the information on the grounds that the published parts of the article were a fair and true report of a speech and constituted privileged communication under Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code, or in the alternative, for a bill of particulars. They also set up a counterclaim for damages for malicious prosecution. The respondent judge denied the motion to quash, stating that the privileged character of the publication is a matter of defense, not a ground for quashal. The prayer for a bill of particulars was also denied, and the counterclaim was struck out. The court also held that the information did not suffer from duplicity of offenses. Petitioners moved for reconsideration, reiterating their arguments and claiming the information charged both libel and slander. The motion for reconsideration was denied, and arraignment was set. The Petition: Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari to annul the order of the respondent judge and for a preliminary injunction to restrain the arraignment and trial.
Issue(s)
Whether the published parts of the article constitute a fair and true report and are therefore privileged communications under Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code, warranting the quashal of the information. Whether the information charges more than one offense (libel and slander). Whether the denial of the motion to quash constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
Ruling
The petition is denied, and the writ of preliminary injunction is dissolved.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of privileged communication and motion to quash: The Court held that whether the comment made by the petitioners was fair or not, or if it was prompted by ill-will or spite, are matters that can only be determined after trial. While a publication imputing political corruption is libelous per se, the privileged character of a communication destroys the presumption of malice. However, the onus of proving malice rests on the plaintiff, and the existence of malice can only be proven after trial on the merits. Therefore, the privileged character of the publication is not a legal ground for the quashal of the information, but rather a matter of defense to be set up during the trial. On the issue of duplicity of offenses: The Court found that the allegations in the information regarding utterances made before the publication were made to strengthen the charge of malice, which is necessary for a conviction of libel. These allegations did not charge a separate offense of slander but served to support the primary charge of libel. Therefore, the information did not suffer from duplicity of offenses. On the issue of grave abuse of discretion: The Court ruled that the orders complained of, denying the motion to quash and the motion for reconsideration, were interlocutory in nature. Such orders cannot be the subject of a petition for certiorari unless there is a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The denial of a motion to quash on the grounds raised by the petitioners is not considered grave abuse of discretion, as these matters can be raised and reviewed on appeal after trial. The Court reiterated that the issues of privilege and duplicity are matters that the trial court must pass upon, and its rulings thereon are subject to review on appeal.
Main Doctrine
The denial of a motion to quash on the ground that the publication is privileged or that the information charges two offenses is an interlocutory order and cannot be appealed. These issues must be passed upon by the trial court and, if adversely decided, may be raised and reviewed on appeal.