Ramirez v. Jimenez
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. initiated a forcible entry and damages suit against Mariano Ramirez y Locsin before the Municipal Court of Quezon City. The case proceeded with the plaintiff presenting its initial witness. However, prior to a scheduled hearing, Ramirez filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Quezon City, seeking to halt the proceedings in the municipal court. This action led to the postponement of the municipal court hearing. Procedural History: The Municipal Court case, Civil Case No. 5466, was dismissed by the CFI in Special Civil Case No. Q-4786 on November 4, 1959, for insufficiency in form and substance, with the CFI stating that appeal, not certiorari, was the proper remedy. No appeal was filed against this dismissal. Subsequently, Ramirez failed to appear at a rescheduled hearing for Civil Case No. 5466, leading to a default judgment against him on March 19, 1960, ordering him to vacate the premises. This judgment became final, and a writ of execution was issued. Meanwhile, Ramirez filed a second petition for certiorari and prohibition with injunction (Special Civil Case No. Q-5030) on February 25, 1960, which was dismissed by the CFI on March 2, 1960, and a motion for reconsideration was denied on March 19, 1960. Ramirez also filed a Petition for Relief from the municipal court judgment in Civil Case No. 5492, which was dismissed by another branch of the CFI on June 18, 1960, and this dismissal became final as it was not appealed. The Petition: The present appeal concerns the validity of the orders issued by the CFI of Rizal, Branch V (Quezon City), dated March 2, 1960, and March 19, 1960, in Special Civil Case No. Q-5030. These orders dismissed Ramirez's petition for certiorari and prohibition and denied his subsequent motion for reconsideration. The appellant argues for the correctness of these orders, emphasizing that certiorari is not a substitute for appeal and that the municipal court had proper jurisdiction over the forcible entry case. The appeal specifically challenges the dismissal of the certiorari petition, not the merits of the original forcible entry judgment, which had already become final and was in the process of execution.
Issue(s)
Whether the Court of First Instance erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari and prohibition. Whether certiorari is the proper remedy when the petitioner failed to appeal the decision of the municipal court.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the Orders of the Court of First Instance dated March 2, 1960, and March 19, 1960, in Special Civil Case No. Q-5030, dismissing the petition for certiorari and prohibition, with costs against the appellant.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Court of First Instance was correct in dismissing the petition for a writ of certiorari and prohibition because the relief prayed for is only proper when there is no speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The trial court found that the remedy of appeal was clearly available to the petitioner but was not utilized. The Supreme Court emphasized that certiorari will lie only when a tribunal has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. In the present case, the Municipal Court was hearing a forcible entry case, which falls under its exclusive cognizance, and it had acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner when he filed his answer. Since the court possessed both subject-matter and personal jurisdiction, its decisions on all questions pertaining to the case were within its authority and could not be corrected by certiorari. Errors of judgment, if any, must be corrected through the process of appeal, which the petitioner failed to pursue. On Issue 2: The Supreme Court explicitly ruled that certiorari will not lie as a substitute for appeal. The petitioner allowed the municipal court judgment to lapse into finality, which led to the issuance of a writ of execution on May 12, 1960. The Court noted that even if the petitioner felt there were irregularities in the trial, his proper recourse was to timely appeal the decision rendered on March 19, 1960. By failing to do so, he wittingly or unwittingly waived his right to challenge the judgment. The Court further observed the 'herculean efforts' of the appellant's counsel to create a defense by filing multiple cases but concluded that a 'wrong choice of remedy' was made in each move. The case of Mendez vs. Kiam cited by the petitioner was distinguished because it involved a defaulting defendant, whereas Ramirez in this case had filed an answer and participated in earlier stages of the trial.
Main Doctrine
Certiorari will not lie as a substitute for appeal, especially when the judgment sought to be reviewed has already become final and executory, and the remedy of appeal was available but not availed of.