Facundo v. Pabalan
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: On July 13, 1960, Valeriano Ulep and Alejandro Facundo jointly filed a petition for mandamus against the municipal mayor, councilors, and treasurer of Asingan, Pangasinan. Petitioner Ulep, a non-civil service eligible, was appointed Local Civil Registry Clerk on February 11, 1948, and had continuously held the position. He took the general clerical civil service examination on February 27, 1960, pursuant to Republic Act No. 2260, the Civil Service Act of 1959. Petitioner Facundo, a third-grade civil service eligible, was appointed Market Collector on October 15, 1958, and had continuously held the position. On June 24, 1960, the municipal council passed Resolution No. 67, abolishing both their positions, and Resolution No. 70, creating four positions for policemen. Four days later, Mayor Carbonell terminated their services. Petitioners alleged that their positions were unlawfully abolished due to revenge and ulterior motives, violating Republic Act No. 2260, and sought reinstatement, damages, and attorney's fees. Respondents countered that the abolished positions were unnecessary, and the appropriations could be used for more important undertakings like maintaining peace and order, asserting that Resolution No. 67 was valid and lawful. Procedural History: The Court of First Instance (CFI) of Pangasinan heard the case. On September 28, 1960, the CFI rendered a decision, finding Resolution No. 67 valid as to Ulep (a non-eligible) but illegal and invalid as to Facundo (a civil service eligible). The CFI ordered Facundo's reinstatement with back salaries from July 1, 1960, but denied damages and costs. Ulep appealed the decision to the Supreme Court (docketed as G.R. No. L-17807). Respondents attempted to appeal the judgment in favor of Facundo, but their appeal was filed outside the reglementary period and was disallowed by the trial court. Respondents did not appeal this disallowance, rendering the decision final and executory for Facundo. Facundo then filed a motion for execution on October 28, 1960, which was opposed by respondents. The Petition: On November 3, 1960, respondent Judge Javier Pabalan issued an order denying Facundo's motion for immediate partial execution, reasoning that the decision was for both Ulep and Facundo, the validity of Resolution No. 67 was a single indivisible proposition, and the Supreme Court might rule on its validity in its entirety in Ulep's appeal. From this order of denial, Facundo filed a petition for certiorari with mandamus (G.R. No. L-17746) with the Supreme Court, alleging that respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion and unlawfully neglected his duty under Section 1, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Ulep's appeal (G.R. No. L-17807) questioned the validity of the abolition of his position and the legality of his separation.
Issue(s)
G.R. No. L-17746: Whether the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion and unlawfully neglected the performance of a ministerial duty by denying the motion for execution of a final and executory judgment in favor of petitioner Alejandro Facundo. G.R. No. L-17807, Issue 1: Whether the municipal council of Asingan, Pangasinan, validly abolished the position of petitioner-appellant Valeriano Ulep. G.R. No. L-17807, Issue 2: In the affirmative, whether the abolition of Ulep's position resulted in his lawful separation, considering he had taken a civil service examination and invoked Section 4, Article XI of the Constitution.
Ruling
In G.R. No. L-17746, the Supreme Court set aside the order of the trial court dated November 3, 1960, which denied execution of its decision of September 28, 1960. The Court directed the trial Judge to immediately issue a writ of execution for Facundo's back salaries from July 1, 1960, to June 19, 1961, noting that Facundo had already been reinstated. In G.R. No. L-17807, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial Judge dated September 28, 1960, with costs against petitioner-appellant Valeriano Ulep.
Ratio Decidendi
On G.R. No. L-17746 (Issue: Denial of Execution): The Supreme Court found Facundo's petition for certiorari with mandamus meritorious. The records clearly showed that the respondents' appeal against the judgment in favor of Facundo was filed out of time and was subsequently disallowed by the trial court. Consequently, the decision in favor of Facundo became final and executory, as mandated by Section 1, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. At this point, Facundo became entitled, as a matter of right, to the execution of the judgment. The Court emphasized that it became the respondent Judge's ministerial duty to issue the writ of execution sought by Facundo, a duty that is compellable by mandamus. The fact that Ulep's appeal was pending and involved the same resolution did not impede the execution of the severable judgment concerning Facundo, who had distinct qualifications and rights as a civil service eligible. The Court cited numerous precedents, including Fiesta v. Llorente and Buenaventura v. Garcia, to support the ministerial nature of the duty to execute a final judgment. On G.R. No. L-17807, Issue 1 (Validity of Abolition of Ulep's Position): The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the municipal council's abolition of Ulep's position. The Court reiterated the well-settled rule that the power to create an office includes the power to abolish it, unless constitutional or statutory provisions dictate otherwise, citing Castillo v. Pajo. However, this power must be exercised in good faith. The Court examined the reasons stated in Resolution No. 67, which cited an excess of personnel and the ability of another clerk to undertake Ulep's duties, and the respondents' justification of applying appropriations to more important undertakings like peace and order. Crucially, the new positions created in Resolution No. 70 were for policemen, whose duties are entirely different from Ulep's. Given these circumstances, the Court was not prepared to declare that the municipal council's action constituted an abuse of power or discretion, citing Rodriguez v. Montinola. On G.R. No. L-17807, Issue 2 (Legality of Ulep's Separation): The Supreme Court ruled that Ulep's separation was lawful. Ulep contended that his removal was illegal because he had taken a civil service examination under Republic Act No. 2260 and that his removal was not for cause, as provided by Section 4, Article XI of the Constitution. However, the Court clarified that there was no 'removal' of Ulep in the sense of being dismissed from an existing position for cause. Instead, his separation resulted from the lawful 'abolition' of his position, which was within the municipal council's power to do. The Court noted that Ulep was not a civil service eligible, and his appointments had always been subject to Section 682 of the Revised Administrative Code, which allows temporary appointments to be terminated at pleasure. His taking of a civil service examination, whose results were not yet announced, did not confer upon him the permanency and protection of civil service law and rules. The Court cited Quitiquit v. Villacorta and Hortillosa v. Ganzon to support the principle that temporary appointments can be terminated at pleasure, and Manalang v. Quitoriano and Dominguez v. Pascual to distinguish between abolition of office and removal for cause.
Main Doctrine
This case establishes and reiterates the principle that the power to abolish an office is inherent in the power to create it, subject to the condition that such abolition must be done in good faith and not for personal or political reasons. It further distinguishes the security of tenure afforded to civil service eligibles, who cannot be removed without cause, from that of non-eligibles, whose temporary appointments can be terminated at pleasure. Crucially, the decision also affirms the ministerial duty of a trial court to issue a writ of execution for a judgment that has attained finality, emphasizing that this duty is compellable by a writ of mandamus, even if other aspects of the original case involving different parties are still under appeal, provided the rulings are severable.